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ABSTRACT
vili
The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debate over the past experience of the 
ERM and the prospect of the creation of EMU, both by throwing new light on issues 
where no agreement has been reached in the literature and by investigating important 
areas so far overlooked Methodologically, we will consider existing theories and test 
for their empirical implications by applying time series econometric techniques; and for 
the ERM crisis of 1992 we develop our own theoretical model and provide preliminary 
empirical results on its implications
In the first chapter we consider the process of disinflation which Europe and the US 
experienced in the 1980s and adopt the Hamilton filter for the analysis of inflation 
differentials for the ERM countries against Germany The results are supportive of the 
view that the ERM membership helped inflation-prone countries to reduce inflation in 
the first phase of their commitment to stable exchange rates, but they also show that a 
sizeable positive differential persisted for Italy
In the second chapter we test for the validity of the empirical implication for expected 
realignments of the model of target zones, proposed by Bertola and Svensson, and 
show that these are not corroborated by our results.
In the third chapter we propose a theoretical model of the ERM crisis of 1992, which 
focuses on how the attitude of the Bundesbank towards the defence of the weak 
currencies in the system feeds into market expectations of the sustainability of the 
System and of future exchange rates
The empirical implication of our theoretical model, as for expected devaluations, is 
considered in details and tested in chapter four, the results seem to be consistent with 
the model.
In chapter five we investigate whether the EU as a whole has the characteristics 
necessary for a successful currency union and in particular focus on how employment 
shocks spread in Europe, the results seem to support the call for a two-speed Europe
IIntroduction
1.1: Historical background
Both the past experience of the ERM, for the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, and 
the future prospect of the formation of a currency union in Europe, have been at the 
centre of attention of academic analysis and the broad economic policy debate in 
recent years.
The origins of the idea of a European currency union go back at least as far as the 
years following the end of the second world war, when the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation and the European Payment Union were founded, the first in 
1948, the second in 1950 (Eichengreen, 1993). A first attempt to establish a monetary 
union in Europe was made in 1962 when the Commission of European Communities 
drafted a plan suggesting the completion of the union within ten years. However, the 
late 1960s brought currency turmoil not only in Europe, but in the whole of the 
Western World; and the Brelton Woods System, which has guaranteed currency 
stability for over twenty years, finally collapsed in the early 1970s. In order to revive 
the program of a currency union, a committee was formed, chaired by Pierre Werner, 
with the objective of drawing up a new plan. The report was finalised by the end of 
1970; like the plan drawn in 1962, it suggested full monetary union within a decade 
with a gradual transition to reach it. The first practical step towards it was the 
formation in 1972 of a scheme of limited exchange rale fluctuations within Europe, 
the so-called 'Snake'. However, due to the effects of the first oil shock in 1973 on the 
E.uropean economies , some of the countries who joined the Snake were forced to 
leave the system, either on a temporary basis or permanently.
A new milestone in the effort to limit exchange rate lluclualions among the countries 
belonging to the European Community was the summit held in Bremen in 1978. which 
led to the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and its core, the 
Exchange Kale Mechanism (EKM): all the countries belonging to the EC at the time
2joined the I.MS in March 1979, except the United Kingdom, which joined the FRM 
only in October 1990.
The FRM was designed as a system of limited fluctuations among the currencies of the 
member countries. The band of fluctuations was established to be of +/- 2.25 around a 
central parity, with the exception of Italy, which was granted a band of +/- 6%. 
Realignments of the central parities were allowed, subject to previous agreement with 
the monetary authorities of the member countries.
According to the Act of Foundation of the FRM, it was established that once two 
currencies hit the limit of their band of fluctuation, the central banks of both the 
countries involved were obliged to intervene in defence of the weak currency. 'These 
interventions shall be unlimited at the compulsory intervention rales’ (document 8, 
section 1, article 2.2 as reported in Kichengreen and Wyploz 1994); credit facilities 
(Very Short Term Facilities, VSTF) were made available to ease the process of 
defence of the central parity.
According to Gros and Thygesen (1992), the history of the FRM until 1992 can be 
seen as evolving in three periods, if we use as a criterion the change in altitude towards 
realignments. In the years between 1979 and 1983 the system looked like a crawling 
peg and experienced eight realignments overall. Between 1983 and 1987 there was a 
lighter commitment to exchange rate stability; alter 1987, and until the currency crisis 
of 1992, great emphasis was pul on the objective of the exchange rale fixity; the goal 
of exchange rate stability within the System acquired more credibility, although full 
credibility was never achieved and it proved to be quite fragile, alter all. Clearly, 
1987 was an important dale also because it marked a substantial change in the way 
central parities were going to be defended: the member countries decided to rely more 
on interest rate changes and on exchange rate flexibility inside the band, rather than 
primarily on interventions. This shift in approach found its lormali/ation in the Basle- 
Nyborg Agreement signed in September 1987.
The change in attitudes towards realignments reflected a change in attitude towards the 
FRM itself: while in the early years its membership was interpreted in a fairly loose
3way, the last period was marked by the resumption of the formation process of the 
Monetary Union. In 1988 the European Council appointed a committee, chaired by 
Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission at the time, whose task was to 
study the feasibility of a Monetary Union. This step followed the agreement over the 
Single Huropean Act in 1986, according to which the EC countries committed 
themselves to create by the end of 1992 a fully integrated European market, where 
commodities, capital and labour could move freely; restrictions to capital movements 
were completely lifted in all the HC countries, with the exception of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, by 1990.
The committee chaired by Delors produced a report which later became the basis of 
the treaty signed in Maastricht at the end of 1991. The Treaty envisages the formation 
of the Huropean Union to be achieved in three stages and establishes four criteria 
which needed to be met for a country to become a member of the Monetary Union (see 
Hichengreen 1993 for details). The earliest date set for the inception of the Union is 
1997. if a majority of countries has met the four criteria by that time; if not, the Treaty 
slates that the Monetary Union should be implemented by the 1st of January 1999, 
even if only a limited number of countries will have met the conditions by that lime 
and, hence, will be able to participate. Recently, it was publicly announced that the 
only date feasible for the formal creation of the HMU will be 1999. Cancelling the 
option for beginning earlier reflects the evident difficulties which the member 
countries are facing and have faced for the past few years. The HRM was plunged into 
crises both in September 1992, which led to the exit of the Italian Lira and the British 
Pound from the System and the fluctuation of their currency, and again in July 199.3, 
when it was decided to enlarge the fluctuation bands for the remaining members from 
+/- 2.25 to +/- 15%. Despite these currency crises, however, the proviso of the 
Maastricht Treaty for the formation of the Monetary Union is still valid, subject to the 
delay of two years, at least at the time of writing.
The attention devoted by the academic research to all the issues related to the creation 
and the working of a Monetary Union and of a system of limited exchange rale
4flexibility, like the ARM Considerable has been considerable (see Masson and Taylor 
1993 for an extensive survey).
1.2: Topics to be considered
The goal of the thesis is to make a contribution to the current debate by shedding light 
on some of the most controversial issues. We aim to analyse the past experience of the 
KRM, with an eye to the lessons which can be learnt for the formation of the Monetary 
Union. Methodologically, we will consider existing theories and test for their 
empirical implications by applying lime series econometric techniques; and, for the 
ERM crisis of 1992, we develop our own theoretical model and provide preliminary 
empirical results on its implications.
I.2.i: Disinflation and the ERM
In the first chapter we investigate the process of disinflation in Europe in the 1980s 
and the possibility that ERM membership had a role to play in it. To clarify the ERM 
role is extremely important as the 'discipline effect’ is often viewed as one of the main 
benefits of the EMU membership. According to The Economist (2nd September 1995. 
page 15), for example, the Italian government believes that the re-entry of the Italian 
Eira in the ERM would help cut the budget deficit and restrain inflation.
The approach followed in the empirical literature on the subject has been to look for 
any significant change in pattern in inflation or any parameter non-constancy in 
relationship between inflation, output growth and wage inflation, usually by analysing 
the pre and post-KRM periods or by dividing the ERM period in two subperiods: 
1979-1983 and post-1983. As a consequence, all the results of the analysis are 
conditional on a given choice of a break dale. In chapter 1 we propose, as an 
alternative, to analyse the time series behaviour of inflation differentials with Germany 
by adopting a recent econometric technique suggested by James Hamilton (1989). This 
allows one to test for the presence of a regime shift in the series and to find the liming 
of the switch in an endogenous fashion. The results, then, do not depend on any prior 
choice of a break dale by the researcher.
5I.2.ii: Devaluations expectations in the ERM
The question on the role of the ERM in the disinflation process is closely linked with 
the issue of credibility of the commitment to exchange rale stability. In the model of 
'imported credibility' (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Giavazzi and Giovanninni 1989), 
which is the main theoretical reference to support the idea of an effective role of the 
ERM membership in bringing down inflation in inflation-prone countries (Italy), the 
crucial aspect lor achieving a lower level of inflation by pegging the exchange rale 
with a strongly inflation-averse country (Germany) instead of by targeting money 
supply growth, is the credibility of the commitment of the exchange rate target.
The literature on the effect of the presence of currency bands on the behaviour of 
exchange rates mushroomed in the first part of the 1990s, following the seminal paper 
by Krugman (1991a) on 'Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics'. While the 
original paper assumed fully credibility of the bands, most of the subsequent literature 
focused on models which allowed for the presence of realignments of the central 
parity, the so called 'second generation target zone models' (see Berlola 1993 for a 
broad survey of this literature); among these models, the one which has received the 
strongest support, on the grounds of favourable empirical evidence, has been proposed 
by Bertola and Svensson (1994), which is why it is subjected to further testing in 
chapter two.
The major difference from the Krugman model is the inclusion, among the 
determinants of the exchange rate, of an expected rate of devaluation, which is 
assumed to follow a Brownian motion process (or, in discrete lime, a random walk). 
Although the authors point out that the assumption of uncorrelated innovations is 
made for tractability and analytical convenience, they do not question the more general 
assumption that devaluation expectations follow an integrated process of the first 
order, 1( 1). The assumption that expectations of a realignment follow an I( 1) process 
does not seem very appealing on economic grounds and, given that the strength of the 
model seems to be the fact that it fils the data better than its alternative, in chapter two 
we test directly for the validity of their assumption. We do this by analysing the lime
6series behaviour of interest rale differentials: it will be shown how the interest rate 
differential can be seen as the sum of three components: expected devaluations, 
expected change of the exchange rate inside the band and a risk premium; as it can be 
assumed that the last two components follow stationary processes, it follows that if the 
expected devaluation actually behaves as an 1(1), the same will be true for interest rate 
differentials.
I.2.iii: A Model of the 1992 ERM crisis
The framework of the target /.one literature will also be adopted to analyse the 
currency crisis which the LRM experienced in 1992 and led to the exit of the Italian 
Lira and the British Pound from the System. It is clear by now that the crisis can be 
attributed to several causes. The victory of the 'no' vote in the Danish referendum on 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, for example, weakened the 
conviction that the Treaty would be ratified after all, given that the approval of all the 
12 countries was needed for it to become operative. Then there are the consequences 
of the German unification, either higher inflation in Germany, qr a general 
realignment implying the revaluation of the Deutschmark, qt disinflation in the other 
HUM countries were needed if tight monetary policies throughout Europe were to be 
avoided. But as for the first of these options, the Bundesbank was strongly against any 
increase in inllation in Germany. As for the second, the German partners, and Prance 
in particular, opposed a general revaluation of the Mark, and as for the third the 
disinflation process in the ERM countries was not sufficient to balance the effects of 
the German reunification.
In the absence of fiscal measures to finance the cost of unification and to check the 
excess deficit in Germany, it followed that tight money emanating from Germany was 
inevitable. But the high level of interest rales in Germany, coupled with the need for 
the other ERM countries to maintain positive interest rate differentials with Germany 
in order to keep exchange rate parity with the Mark provoked pressure on their 
domestic markets, which were going through a recession period. This aspect of the
7crisis has found detailed analysis in the models proposed by Masson (1994). Obstfeld 
(1994) and Ozkan and Sutherland (1994).
One aspect of the crisis widely recognised in the institutional literature (liichengreen 
and Wyploz 1994, Kenen 1994), but not in the theoretical literature, is the attitude of 
the Bundesbank towards defending the currencies of the System under attack. Despite 
the fact pointed out earlier that the Act of Foundation of the HRM calls for 
intervention of 'possibly unlimited amount' in order to defend currencies under 
pressure, it became patently clear in September 1992 that the German central bank had 
no intention of doing so. Indeed, this was clear both to the Bundesbank and to the 
German Government from the beginning of the FRM experience: in a speech to the 
Bundestag in December 1978, the Finance Minister of the time said that '...the 
Bundesbank has the responsibility to intervene, and the option not to intervene if it is 
its opinion that it is not able to do so..'.
The two-country model contained in chapter three includes a facility for borrowing 
reserves to see how it affects expectations of future exchange rates and the behaviour 
of exchange rate inside the band. It considers a situation where the domestic country 
(Italy or the UK) has run out of reserves in order to defend its currency and, in order to 
maintain the sustainability of the system, the central bank of the foreign country 
(Germany) agrees to provide a loan. The foreign central bank, however, has the right 
to call back the loan at any time and the probability of the loan being called back is 
modelled as a Poisson process with constant probability. If the loan is called back, the 
target zone becomes unsustainable and the exchange rale will lloat. The possibility of 
the switch affects market expectations ahead of lime and influences the way the 
exchange rate behaves inside the band.
Unlike the standard case of a 'peso problem' where there is a stochastic devaluation 
component, the possibility of a switch between a target zone and a free Boat (where 
the loan has been called back and has to be repaid in full) implies that the future 
exchange rale will contain a random walk component. This will be the focus of 
chapter four and the empirical results provided in the chapter seem to be consistent
8with the model detailed in chapter three, although the test adopted for the analysis is 
affected by low power and further empirical testing is required.
I.2.iv: Employment and Unemployment: EU vs EMU
Despite the exit of the Italian Lira and the British Found from the ERM and the 
broadening of the bands for the remaining LRM currencies to a substantial +/- 15%, 
the prospect of the creation of the Monetary Union by 1999 is still on place. One 
question that has grown in importance in recent years is how suited are the EU 
economies for EMU; this issue has revived interest in the literature on optimum 
currency areas, first proposed by Mundell (1961). According to this theory, the cost of 
relinquishing monetary autonomy is small if the incidence of disturbances affecting 
the members of the currency area is mainly symmetric and if there is high factor 
mobility to adjust quickly to asymmetric shocks. One strand of the recent literature to 
date has focused on the comparison between the states of the USA and the EU 
countries as far as the evolution of prices and output (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, 
Bayoumi and Thomas 1995); another has focused on the comparison between the 
states of the US and European regions with reference to the response to shocks of 
labour markets. There is no analysis to date, however, of the relative performance of 
national European labour markets, the type and size of shocks faced by them and the 
kind of response. This will be the focus of the fifth chapter of the thesis.
To consider the analysis at national and not at regional level appears important, as the 
EMU will be first among countries, although regional issues will doubtless dominate 
once the process of economic and monetary unification will be completed, in the 
meantime it seems inevitable that national issues will predominate. In the chapter we 
will analyse the evolution of employment, unemployment and participation rates for 
the EU members in the past twenty years and the relative performance of each country 
vis-a-vis the EU as a whole. We consider the lime-series dimension of the data by 
focusing on the long-run relationship among the national and the EU-wide variables; 
we also exploit the lime-series dimension coupled with the cross-section one, by 
adopting panel data analysis. We study the nature of employment shocks in Europe
9and analyse the response to shocks of all the variables just mentioned. Furthermore we 
see whether our results of our analysis allow us to divide the FU members in two 
groups, the 'core' and the 'periphery' and, if so, which countries belong to which group. 
In the conclusions we will draw together the results of the analysis contained in the 
thesis and the lessons which can be learnt from them.
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Chapter 1:
The process of disinflation of the 1980s: Is there an ERM effect?
1.1: Introduction
The process of disinflation has been a major aspect of the performance of the US and 
the European economies in the 1980s and one that has attracted considerable attention 
in the academic arena. In particular, a large debate has been raised, both at theoretical 
and empirical level, relative to the role of the ERM membership and the commitment 
to stable exchange rates within the System in the process of disinflation.
This issue has relevance for the analysis of the past experience: among the ERM 
countries, the most significant cases are represented by France and Italy; both these 
countries, which in the early 1980s were known for being inflation-prone countries, 
adopted a very restrictive monetary policy in order to bring down inflation, which in 
Italy reached, at its peak in 1982, a value of 20% per annum. If their success in 
reducing inflation was made easier by maintaining stable exchange rates against the 
DM is the question we will try to solve in this chapter. One aspect of the past 
experience of the ERM which needs to be borne in mind in trying to evaluate its role 
in the disinflation process, is the changing altitude towards realignments. This, as 
pointed out by tiros and Thygesen (1992), can be seen as developing in three stages; 
between 1979 and the realignment of 1983 the System was quite similar to a crawling 
peg; in this case, in the definition of the ERM as a system of 'fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates', the stress was on the term 'adjustable'. After that date, and until 1987, 
realignments were less frequent and smaller in size than previously and alter 1987 
there were no realignments at all, with the exception of the realignment for the Italian 
lira in January 1990 that coincided with the reduction of its allowed band of 
fluctuations to +/- 2.25% (1).
The question on the role of the KRM is also important once we take into account that 
the belief that KRM membership means sharing its counter-inflationary benefits is one 
of the factors at the base of the UK decision to join the KRM in October 1990 (Artis 
and Omerod 1994).
The relevance of the topic is not confined to the evaluation of the past experience; it 
also affects the discussion on the perspective membership in the Monetary Union, 
which should be established by 1999. During the summer of 1995 the Italian 
government expressed the intention to rejoin the KRM by the end of the same year, in 
order to fulfil the requirement relative to exchange rate stability against the other 
currencies in the System. The same governments stressed that one of the incentives of 
joining KMU would be the gain in terms of price stability (as reported in The 
Economist September 2nd 1995).
The question on the role of the KRM membership in the process of disinflation has not 
found in the literature to date, either theoretical or empirical, a definitive answer. The 
goal of this chapter is to provide an empirical contribution, able to shed new light on 
the issue at stake: we do this by applying a new econometric technique proposed in 
recent years by Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990) to the inflation differential between each 
of the countries belonging to the KRM since the start and Germany. The UK will be 
also considered, as control case.
Section two will review the existing literature; section three will be devoted to the 
description of Hamilton's econometric methodology and its extension by Garcia and 
Perron (1990). In section four we present and comment the results of implementing 
the Hamilton filter for the scries of inflation differentials for the KRM countries 
against Germany. Section five provides further analysis of the French and Italian 
cases. Pinal remarks will be contained in section seven.
1.2: A survey of the literature
The main theoretical model on the role of the KRM in the process of disinflation has 
been proposed by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and has been labelled the 'imported
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credibility' model, as , in this setting, the inflation-prone country, Italy or France, 
imports the credibility of the inflation-averse country, Germany, through the 
commitment to stable exchange rates with it.
The model is based on the framework proposed by Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), 
which is an open-economy extension of the model by Barro and Gordon (1983). It 
considers the government of a high inflation country, trying to reduce the level of 
inflation. We refer the reader to the original paper for the details of the model; what 
we are going to do here is to highlight its major characteristics. It is a two-country 
model which focuses on the interactions, within each country, between the public and 
the monetary authorities and between monetary authorities of the two countries. 
Consider first the characteristics of the game between each government and the private 
sector: as in the Barro and Gordon model, the policy maker has an inflation and an 
employment target; the second is such that it is higher than the natural level 
employment level; the instrument that the government has at its disposal to reach its 
targets is given by the money growth rate. Two crucial assumptions of the model are 
that, first, wages, set by the private sector, cannot react instantaneously to current 
information and, second, the private sector forms expectations rationally. Hoe to the 
fact that wages are sluggish, the government has an incentive to create surprise 
inflation in order to reach a higher level of employment than the natural one. However 
the private sector takes into account the government’s incentive of creating surprise 
inflation when they form their expectations. These assumptions lead to an inflationary 
bias in the Nash equilibrium , lime consistent outcome of the game among government 
and private sector: the level of employment equals the natural rate and there is a 
positive level of inflation.
Suppose now that the employment target in the domestic country, Italy, is higher than 
in the foreign country, Germany; this implies that also the inflation rate in Italy is 
higher than in Germany. In case of flexible exchange rates, then the game is such that 
each government sets monetary policy taking as given price expectations in the 
domestic labour market, thus generating a lime-consistent equilibrium, and the loreign
13
country’s money supply, thus generating a Nash equilibrium in the interaction with the 
foreign country. In case of flexible exchange rates there will be two different levels of 
inflation, with the domestic one being higher; both the levels of inflation, however, are 
lower than the one generated in the closed economy, due to the effect of the game 
between the two governments.
Things are different once we consider a fixed exchange rate regime: suppose that the 
inflation-prone country commits itself to peg its exchange rate with the foreign, low 
inflation country; by doing this, the domestic government loses any power to conduct 
monetary policy and adopts the one existing in the foreign country, as for a fixed 
exchange rate to be sustainable (and given the assumptions of the model), domestic 
money growth has to equal money growth abroad. Given that the stance of monetary 
policy abroad is more restrictive that the domestic one, and the level of inflation 
lower, it then follows that the domestic country imports the credibility of the foreign 
monetary authorities. In other words, the Italian government can lower the 
expectations of inflation of the private sector, and hence the equilibrium level of 
inflation, by pegging the exchange rate against the Deutsche Mark and allowing 
monetary policy to be set by the German authorities. In order for this to happen, 
however, it is necessary that the commitment to fixed exchange rale is a credible one; 
why should an exchange rate commitment be more credible than a money growth 
target is an obvious question to raise. There could be two reasons for this: first, 
exchange rate changes are costly for the monetary authorities, second, the reasons to 
change the exchange rate can be monitored more easily, and 'cheating' on the side of 
the government becomes more difficult, than in presence of a money target. Giavazzi 
and Giovannini themselves, however, note that the reasons why a commitment to 
fixed exchange rates should be more credible than a monetary target arc fairly weak 
and conclude that 'the absence of a strong theoretical argument makes the empirical 
evidence even more important' (Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989, page 104).
As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, the experience of disinflation in the 
1980s is common to all the Western European countries, as well as the US and not
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only to the LRM members: it there is any role in this process played by the LRM 
membership is the focus of the empirical analysis.
In order to test for any change in the price expectation formation by the private sector, 
(iiavazzi and Giovannini (1989) estimate, for France, Germany, Italy and the UK and 
for the period 1960-1987, the following system for the dynamics of prices, wages and 
income
1.1) Yt = A(L) Yt_ i + B(L) Zt_ j + ut
where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials in the lag operator, Yt = |p t, wt, yt|' is the 
vector of endogenous variables: inflation. change in wages (i.e. wage inflation) and 
income, and Z is the vector including a time trend, dummies and the exogenous 
variables, among which the change in the money supply.
According to the Lucas critique, a change in the stance of economic policy, such as the 
participation to the LRM or the turnaround in France and Italy in 1983, should 
generate a change in the statistical relationship among the variables of the system, 
(iiavazzi and Giovannini exploit this, by testing for a structural break at the beginning 
of 1979 and in 1983. The results do not seem to support the implications of their 
theoretical model, as the null hypothesis of no structural break cannot be rejected in 
any of the cases considered, with the exception of France in 1979. More favourable 
results are obtained if the model is estimated for the pre-liRM period and then the 
parameters are used to build the endogenous variables: it turns out that the forecasts 
for inflation and wage inflation are higher than the actual level. This result is, 
according to Giavazzi and Giovannini, supportive of the hypothesis of a shill in 
expectations, but one that took place well alter the inception of the HRM.
Another study that has found an LRM effect in the disinflation process has been 
pursued by Artis and Omerod (1994). Their goal is first to look for evidence of 
credibility in inflation-expectations' generators; second, if there is an extra effect in the
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formation of wages, by testing for parameter non-constaney. The countries considered 
include Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands.
In order to answer the first question, they model price inflation as an AR(4) process 
and add in the specification lagged German inflation and institutional dummies. Given 
their belief that, if there was any 'FRM effect', this had an effect well after the 
inception of the System, they test for the above specification for the period 1979-1982 
and 1983-1989. Their results indicate that, for Italy (2) and France, the German 
inflation term is significant for the FRM period, but not for the pre-FRM one; in the 
case of Belgium and the Netherlands the German inflation is significant in both the 
subsamples; at the same time inflation in Germany was remarkably stable. They then 
conclude that the results are in support for the 'German dominance hypothesis’, which 
is strongly linked to the model of imported credibility.
The second part of the analysis involves the estimation of a wage equation, written in 
the error-correction form, which includes among the regressors the expected rate of 
inflation, i.e. the fitted values of the regression estimated in the first part of their study. 
The goal here is to lest for any structural change in the wage equation process, l or 
France and Italy there does not seem to be a substantial change in the structure of the 
wage equation, although the periods pre and post-FRM are separated by a transition 
period not included in the estimation; on the contrary, for Belgium it appears that there 
is a substantial downward shift on the parameter attached to inflation expectations, i.c. 
in this case, in the period post-FRM there would be a smaller increase in wage 
inflation, given a \%  increase in expected inflation.
Overall, the result supports, according to the authors, the view that German inflation is 
a significant component of inflation expectations' formation and, through this channel, 
it influences the labour market behaviour, thus sustaining the argument of an added 
gain in deflating within the FRM.
Fvidence that there was no specific FRM effect in the experience of disinflation has 
also been provided in the literature. Collins (1988) estimates an equation for the 
determinants of inflation, change in real money supply, change in income and inflation
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expectations (proxied by actual inflation) by applying a panel for KRM and non-ERM 
countries for the period 1974-1985. In order to test for the existence of an ERM effect, 
she adds three dummies: first, a dummy for all the countries, which allows for 
inflation to differ for the periods pre and post the ERM; second a dummy for the 
ERM countries only for the period 1979-1985, which, like the first, allows for 
inflation to differ for the two periods, but in this case only for the ERM members; 
third a dummy that allows the ERM countries to have a different constant term in the 
pre-ERM period. The results of the estimation (see Collins table 5.4) indicate that the 
ERM-specific dummy is not significant, even more so when expected inflation is 
proxied by lagged instead of current inflation. The author herself, however, points out 
that the results are not very robust, given than the regression appears to be highly 
misspecified.
As Eichengreen (1992a) points out, the result obtained by Collins might be due to the 
fact that the sample size is limited to 1985 and, thus, the analysis cannot pick up any 
'ERM effect' which, if exists, took place in the mid 1980s. He extends the analysis by 
Collins, by considering a sample up to 1989 and a dummy for the period 1986-1990 
and finds that the EMS effect is still not significant; the result does not seem to change 
if Germany is excluded from the panel . Eichengreen seems convinced that it is more 
the determination of ERM countries to reduce inflation that allowed for the ERM to be 
successful in the 1980s, more than the ERM had a causal role in bringing inflation 
down.
The papers reviewed in this section test for the ERM effect by establishing ex-ante a 
break period; the results are then conditional on the choice of the break dale. The 
approach contained in this chapter is substantially different: we will look for a break in 
the series of inflation rale differentials with Germany by means of the Hamilton filter, 
which allows for a structural break to be determined endogenously. In this way the 
results do not depend on a particular choice of break and it is possible to determine if 
and when a break in the series has occurred.
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1.3: Methodology: A brief description of the Hamilton filter and its extension
The technique used in the empirical analysis is due to Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990) 
and is a particularly useful device for detecting shifts in regime.
The filter can be applied when the series under scrutiny follows a non-linear, 
stationary autoregressive process and the switch between regimes is governed by a 
Markov process.
The non-linear nature of the filter is due to the assumption of discrete shifts in regime 
which radically alter the dynamic behaviour of the series.
formally, it is assumed that the series yt follows a stochastic process which can be 
expressed as:
1.1) yt - p(St) = <> i(yt- 1  - H(St-|))  + • - +  <t>m (yt-m - H(s t-m)> + CT(St)ut
The mean p and the variance are functions of the regime in place at a given time, u 
is assumed to be distributed as N(0,1). The regime, or state, is denoted by St; it is 
modelled as an unobserved, discrete time, two-state first-order Markov process, taking 
a value of either 0 or 1. Given the Markov property, S(. | , if known, summarises all the 
information available at lime t-l which can be used to forecast the state at time l:
1 -2) P(St=stISt_ | = st_ i ) = p(St=stISt_ i = st_ i .....St_m=st-m)
It is possible to parameterize the mean and the standard deviation of the process as 
follows:
1.3) p(St) = <*<) + a jS t
with
cxq = p(S=0) mean in slate 0
Of) + a |  = (i(S=l) mean in stale 1 
and
1.4) <y(St) = w0 + w]St
with
w() = o(S=0) standard deviation in slate 0 
wq + w i = a(S= 1) standard deviation in state 1
The states, however, are not direetly observable and their historical sequence has to be 
inferred from the observable series yt.
The procedure proposed by Hamilton consists of drawing inferences on the state at 
time t, St, based on inferences about the slate at time t-1, St_j, and on data on y 
observed up to time t.
The transition matrix that governs the transition between states is:
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where
p = p(St=HSt_ j = l) 
q = p(St=0ISt=0)
The filter contains five steps:
SttfP 1:
from the output of the filter at time t-1 and the conditional probability 
p(St=StlSt_j=St_i), the joint probability of the sequence St, St_i.....St_m is obtained:
1.6 ) p(St. i =st-1.....St.m=st.ml yt_ i  y0) P(St=st I St. ] =st. \ ) =
= p(St=Si, s t_ 1 =st. 1 .... St-m=st_ml yt-1......yo)
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in deriving 1.6 the assumption that the transition between states follows a first order 
Markov process has been used
Step 2:
from the output of the first step and the density of yt conditional on past valued of St 
and yt. the joint density of yt and the sequence of states is obtained:
1.7) p(S(=st. St.]=st. S t_m=st_ml y t-l.....yo) Kytlst-l=st- l.....^t-m=st-m) =
= f(yt, St=st, St. 1=st_i.....St.m=st.ml yt. i ......yo)
f(yt. St=st, St_! =st_ i .....St _m=St.ml yt. i ......yo) is a normal distribution with mean
litSj) and variance (S[).
Step 3:
the joint conditional distribution f(yt, St=st, St_ j =st_ | ..... Sl_rn=st_ml yt. j .... yo) is
then marginalized with respect to the sequence of states and the distribution of yj 
conditional on its own history is thus obtained:
1.8) i  ... i  f(yt. St=st, St_ i =st_!  St.m=sl.mi yt. |  y0) = t(yt I yt- i  yo)
A',=" S,
a by-product of the filter at this stage is the estimation of the unknown parameters (a],  
0 (). p, q. <t>|,..„ <t>m, W(). W)) via the maximisation of the conditional log likelihood
i .9) log K y j ......ym 1 ym-1.....vo) = £  li,8 « y i 1 yt-1.... yo)
Step 4:
from the output of the second and third steps the conditional probability of the states 
is obtained:
1. 10)
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l'(yt. S t=st. St_| =st_j.....S ,.m=st.ml yt-],...,yo)/f(yt I yt- i ......yo) =
= p(St=st.....s t.m=st.mi yt......yo)
Step. 5:
finally, the conditional probability obtained in stage lour is marginalized with respect 
to St_m to obtain the final output:
1
1 11) X  P(St=st.....St.m=st_mlyt,...,yo) = p(St=st,..., St_m+i=st_m+1lyt,...,y0)
which is then the input for the filter at time t+1.
To start the first iteration, as p(St_ j =st_ j S t - m  =st-m*yt-1 • • •• ,y())' s not available, the 
procedure followed by Hamilton (1989) considers the unconditional distribution of the 
states , p(Sm.i=sm.i,S m_2=sm-2.....So=so). which is evaluated as:
1.12) p(Sm_i=srn_],Srn_2=srn_2....,Sf)=so) = P(Sm-l=sm -l^m -2=sm-2) - P ^ 0 =s())
where for the generic time index n, 
p( Sn=snISn. i =sn. i ) = P 
where P is the transition matrix 
and p(S()=sq) = 11 = (Flo, n  j )
where n  is the equilibrium probability distribution and Flo and FT j are the 
unconditional probabilities of being respectively in state 0 and in state 1.
In case the states are found to be highly persistent, it is possible to check for the 
presence of three stales, according to what suggested by Garcia and Perron (1990). 
The procedure consists of splitting the sample into two overlapping subsamples and 
applying the Hamilton filter with two states in both subsamples. If the filter clearly
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identifies two states in both subsamples, it is likely that the model with three states 
applies to the full sample. The authors note, however, that the procedure is not totally 
free of the intervention by the researcher, as the choice of how to split the sample 
implicitly determines the end and the beginning of the period.
1.4: The results of the implementation of the Hamilton filter for inflation 
differentials
In this section we analyse the evolution of inflation differentials between Germany and 
the other KRM countries for the period 1979-1990 (4). The technique proposed by 
Hamilton and described in the previous section allows one to detect precisely any shift 
in regime where the alternatives are a state of high mean-high variance and one with 
low mean-low variance (5). It does this by assigning to each observation an 
appropriate distribution with constant mean and variance and with endogenous sample 
separation. As we pointed out in section two of this chapter, this characteristic of the 
technique is very important as it allows one to discover any distinctive phases in the 
evolution of inflation differentials in the first ten years of the FRM and to detect the 
precise timing of the turning points when these are found.
Differently to the mixed nature of the results found in the empirical literature surveyed 
in section two of this chapter, our results seem to be consistent with the model of 
imported credibility. The inflation differentials for France and Italy show a totally 
different stochastic behaviour from those of the other countries considered here, 
including the UK. In the first case, (see figures 1.3 and 1.4 and table 1.1) there is a 
clear-cut separation of the overall period into two subperiods: indeed, the filter assigns 
stale 1 to all of the observations up to 1984 and state 0 to all of the observations 
thereafter. In contrast to this, the inflation differential between the UK and Germany 
docs not show any change in pattern during the period considered in the analysis (see 
figure 1.6 and table 1.1). The different stochastic properties of the series between 
France and Italy, on the one hand, and the UK, on the other hand, seem to be 
consistent with the model of 'imported credibility' and the hypothesis of an FRM effect
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in the disinflation process for the member countries. Although the aim of reducing 
inflation was a goal shared by most European countries, membership of the I.KM 
made the achievement more successful.
The timing of the shift in regime, which both for France and for Italy took place in 
1984-1985, adds further support to the hypothesis. The French and Italian tightening 
of economic policy around 1984 can be attributed, according to Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1989, chapter 4), both to the desire of the governments to remain in the 
F.KM and to their willingness to appeal to the ERM rules as an external justification 
for unpopular domestic policies.
A pattern similar to the one found for France and Italy is not observed for the smaller 
countries of the ERM, except possibly for Belgium (see figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.5 and table 
1.1). This does not conflict with our interpretation of the results. Countries such as 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, together with Germany, were already part of 
the exchange rate agreement which preceded the ERM, the ’Snake'. For these 
countries, therefore, the onset of the ERM did not represent a fundamental policy 
regime shift.
1.5: More on the French and Italian cases
In the previous section we observed that a clear change in regime in the series of 
inflation differentials is present for France and Italy in 1984, when we consider the 
sample 1979-1990. Given the importance of their experience, we decided to check for 
the robustness of the results and extended the analysis in two directions. First we 
considered a larger sample period and run the filter for the inflation differential 
between 1975 and 1990 (see figures 1.7 and 1.8); it could be possible that the filler is 
unable to detect a shift in regime at the beginning of the ERM experience for lack of 
enough observations on the 'high inflation regime'; the results strongly refute this 
hypothesis for both the countries considered (see table 1.2). In other words, once the 
sample includes the pre-ERM period, as well as the first ten years of the ERM, it 
appears that still the break takes place in 1984 for the 'inflation-prone' countries (6).
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These results are consistent with the ones obtained by Artis and Omerod, surveyed in 
section 1 of this chapter.
Note that, for both France and Italy, by extending the sample period to 1975-1990, 
not only the timing of the shift in regime remains unaltered with respect to the one 
detected for the period 1979-1990 remains unaltered, but the values found for average 
inflation in the two regimes are very similar to the ones obtained for the shorter 
sample period.
There is also another line of research that is worth pursuing. Gros and Thygesen 
(1992) note that the main criterion for describing the evolution of the HRM is the 
changing attitude towards realignments; this implies a division in three periods: 
between 1979 and 1983, 1984 and 1987 and after 1987. The regime shift in 1984 
corresponds closely with the above mentioned change in attitude towards 
realignments. It could be that also the further commitment to stable exchange rates 
corresponds to a second break in the inflation differential. If this is the case, the series 
would be characterised by three different stales, corresponding to the three periods 
indicated above. The way to test for the presence of three states has been suggested by 
Garcia and Perron (1990), as we pointed out in section three. The overlapping samples 
have been chosen as follows: for Italy the first subsample goes from February 1979 to 
December 1984 and from August 1983 to December 1990; for France the first 
subsample spans from February 1979 to June 1986, the second from June 1984 to 
December 1990; the overlapping period for France has been chosen to be longer than 
for Italy, given that it appears that the switch was somewhat more gradual for the first 
country. The results, shown in table 1.3 and 1.4 and in figures 1.9 to 1.12 do not 
support the hypothesis of the existence of a third state for either France or Italy: whilst 
a clear regime shift is found for the first period, the second subsample is not 
characterised by any shift in the process followed by the inflation differential. This 
result might reflect the fact that the meaning itself of belonging to FIRM changed 
radically for the inflation-prone countries in 1983-1984, while the stronger 
commitment to stable exchange rates was a reinforcement of the same policy stance.
24
As a consequence the inflation differential might have changed subsequent to the 
change in policy, while it did not vary in a significant way for the post-1987 period. 
Another relevant aspect that needs to be pointed out is the size of the inflation 
differential. In the case of France not only the degree of inflation convergence to the 
German level was quite substantial, but also the mean difference was only about 1% in 
the period after 1984. On the contrary, in the case of Italy although the convergence of 
its inflation level towards the German one was a very important aspect of the 
performance of its economy in the mid 1980s, the differential remained quite high, in 
the region of 4%; our result shows that such a differential did not tend to decline 
significantly after 1987.
The results shown in this section strengthen, in our opinion, the ones that we 
commented upon in the previous section: there was a clear change in regime in the 
process followed by the inflation differential with Germany for France and Italy in 
1983-1984. No sign of a break at the beginning of the HRM experience was found 
even when we extended the sample to include four years of the pre-FRM period. The 
fact that there was no break in 1987 can be explained by noticing that in that year there 
was no change in policy, but a strengthening of the same economic stance.
1.6: Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the experience of the Furopean disinflation in the 1980s. 
The purpose is mainly to contribute to the debate on the role of liRM membership on 
the process of disinflation itself, but also to shed some light on the consequences of the 
disinflation process for the liU in the 1990s.
We noted that ail the empirical literature which tackles the question of the role of the 
FRM in the disinflation experience establishes date breaks exogenously: the usual 
procedure for testing for an ’FRM effect' is to lest for a structural break either in 1979 
or in 1983, with the break dates set before the implementation of the testing procedure. 
The advantage of the methodology adopted in this paper, proposed by Hamilton, is 
that the determination of the break dale in the pattern followed by inflation
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differentials with Germany is not dependent on the choice of the econometrician; on 
the contrary it is an output of the filter the precise finding of the break date, if any is 
found; in other words the filter allows for an endogenous assessment of the likely 
break in the series.
The results obtained by adopting this technique are consistent with the view that the 
KRM helped the inflation-prone countries, such as t rance and Italy, in their objective 
of reducing their level of inflation; a clear-cut break in the series given by the inflation 
is found for these two countries. The same is not true for Denmark, the Netherlands 
and, possibly. Belgium: this result can be explained by recalling that these countries 
were part of the 'Snake', the exchange rate arrangement that tried to limit exchange 
rate fluctuations in some of the European countries in the 1970s, and that their 
participation to the KRM did not represent a fundamental policy regime shift. In our 
analysis we also considered the case of the UK, which experienced disinflation outside 
the ERM: the filter is unable, in this case, to find any shift in regime. The observation 
that the disinflation process was not specific to the ERM members is one of the 
leading argument of those who deny the presence of an 'ERM effect': in this chapter 
we are able to show that actually there is a substantial difference between the 
disinflation experience for France and Italy, on one hand, and the UK on the other. 
Another argument that has been raised against the thesis of the 'ERM effect' is related 
to the performance of unemployment in the 1980s in Europe (see lie Grauwe 1989): 
not only unemployment increased substantially after the shocks that hit the Western 
economies in the 1970s, but, for the European countries, it stayed persistently high in 
the following decade. According to this thesis, hence, the disinflation was 'paid' by an 
increase in unemployment. Also in this case, the experience of the UK vis-i-vis the 
one of the other European countries is illuminating and allows us to refute the 
argument just outlined: the UK experienced high and persistent inflation in the 1980s 
as well as the ERM countries (see chapter 5 of this thesis).
Also the liming of the shift in regime for France and Italy, around 1984, seems in 
accordance with the implications of the model of 'imported credibility'; as Giavazzi
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and Giovannini (1989) note, the actions taken in order to reduce inflation could be 
attributed both to the desire of the government to remain in the liRM and to their 
willingness to appeal to the TRM rules as an external justification for unpopular 
domestic policies. The results relative to the timing are strengthened once a long 
sample size, spanning from 1975 to 1990 is considered: no break appears to have taken 
place in 1979. while a clear one is obtained for 1984, for both countries.
Tinally, once we test for the presence of a further regime shift for Trance and Italy, we 
do not find any evidence of it: it seems that the tightening of the commitment to stable 
exchange rates in 1987 was not reflected in a further reduction in the average inflation 
differential with Germany. This does not seem surprising for Trance, given that from 
1984 onwards the average differential with Trance was of 1%; for Italy, however, the 
differential remained of considerable size, about 4%. The persistence of a positive 
inflation differential, coupled with the absence of realignments (with the exception of 
the one in January 1990), thus generating a cumulative loss in competitiveness, is 
commonly agreed to be one of the causes of the crisis of the Italian lira in September 
1992 (see Tichengreen and Wyploz 1993). This leads us to conclude that there is 
enough evidence to suggest that the TRM made easier a certain degree of convergence 
for the inflation-prone countries; however, in the case of Italy the convergence was far 
from being complete and the lack of M l convergence, is understood by the literature, 
was subsequently one of the causes of the collapse of the lira in the currency crisis of 
1992.
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Footnotes
(1) For a detailed survey on the history and the evolution ol' the ERM see Gros and 
Thygesen (1992)
(2) for Italy, the regression has been estimated over the period 1972-1979 and 1982- 
1989; the period 1979-1982 has been left out as its inclusion would have created sever 
problems in the econometric estimation; the authors take this as a sign that the 
breakpoint in the inflation process occupied that period
(3) in chapter 3 we will provide a theoretical model of the HRM crisis which led to the 
exit from the KRM of the Italian lira and the British pound
(4) All the data have been collected through DATASTREAM; the source of CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) is OECD. In the majority of cases we have considered annual 
inflation rates, built by compounding the monthly inflation rates, instead of calculating 
the rate of change of CPI on an annual basis. We have done this in order to preserve 
the variability in the series, which is needed to implement the Hamilton filter.
(5) The words 'high mean-high variance' and 'low mean-low variance' do not have to 
be interpreted in absolute, but in relative terms. It is perfectly possible that the mean 
inflation differential of the 'low mean’ state in one country is actually higher than the 
mean in the 'high mean' state in another country. What we want to test for in section 4 
of this chapter, is the presence of two different states in the process of inflation 
differentials with Germany, characterised by two different means and variances.
(6) For the extended period 1975-1990 we used monthly inflation differentials, in 
order to check that the results do not depend on our choice of modelling inflation; the 
choice of monthly inflation is given by the fact that in this way we are able to have as 
large a frequency as possible and that, at the same time, the data are not overlapping, 
which might interfere with the way the filter works.
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Figure 1.3b: Hamilton probabilities
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Table 1.1: Inflation differentials 1979-1990
Belgium Denmark France Italy Neth. UK
«1 5.609659 9.818929 4.838052 7.324158 5.086215 17.17391
«0 1.179244 2.008626 1.743562 4.829122 -4.659323 3.198914
p 0.009911 0.003608 0.992603 0.988421 0.901 0.000001
0 0.879783 0.838392 0.993538 0.993004 0.000585 0.883677
WO 3.516340 4.685227 2.398444 2.75669 9.466588 4.493030
01 0.364356 0.020842 0.396181 0.323986 0.212504 0.196236
02 -0.00189 -0.39214 -0.08957 -0.18859 -0.296378 0.039731
03 -0.12638 -0.00127 0.1402 0.174625 -0.206147 -0.108511
04 0.090918 -0.4256 -0.18862 -0.00883 -0.106657 0.11588
Wf)+w 1 5.005350 4.106627 4.7025 7.873861 3.09835 1.645278
___!°£L__ -264.787 -300.587 -237.788 -272.05 -258.4875 -224.6134
Annual inflation rates expressed as percentages 
logL is the value of the log likelihood
Table 1.2: Monthly inflation differentials 1975-1990
France Italy
“ 1 0.347731 0.501188
«0 0.145412 0.388414
P 0.99495 0.9916
q 0.993992 0.992832
Wf) 0.192647 0.22031
01 0.376533 0.28821
02 -0.0341474 -0.159374
03 0.0527615 0.098411
04 -0.165284 -0.0305924
W O + W  1 0.35881 0.563318
_________ _____________ 140.398321 87.50073
Monthly inflation rates expressed as percentages 
log L is the log likelihood
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Table 1.3: Inflation differentials 1979-1986 (France) and 1979-1984 (Italy)
France Italy
«1___________ 3.58355 6.31163
«0__________ 3.28438 6.54852
p___________ 0.98598 0.9861723
q___________ 0.985134 0.968724
wn__________ 2.98311 1.17159
01___________ 0.328974 0.385091
-0.0740907 -0.550005
<}>3 0.100327 0.163312
04__________ -0.167796 -0.263895
WO+W 1 4.81758 7.88093
_________ !2âL_________ -164.524739 -156.40384
Annual inflation rates expressed as percentages 
log L is the log likelihood
Table 1.4: Inflation differentials 1984-1990 (France) and 1983-1990 (Italy)
France Italy
«1___________ 1.59601 3.99874
« 0 __________ 1.75692 4.63728
P 0.936858 0.9319873
q 0.999999 0.999999
W() 2.31355 2.6785
01___________ 0.52471 0.201984
02 -0.108 -0.112598
03 0.132837 0.205559
04 -0.16792 0.143968
wn+w i 3.26163 5.19874
logL -100.599
Annual inflation rates expressed as percentages 
logL is the log likelihood
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Chapter 2:
Expected Devaluation and Integration Accounting
2.1 Introduction
Following the seminal paper by Krugman (1991a), considerable attention has been 
devoted to the study of the behaviour of exchange rates within a target zone. As a 
result, ironically enough, the original Krugman model has been now widely dismissed, 
finding little empirical support either from the currencies of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism or from the unilateral target zone adopted by the Swedish Krona (see, 
among others. Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991) and Eindberg and Soderlind 
(1994a)).
Two of the specific implications of the original model that have been rejected 
empirically are the deterministic and negative relationship it predicted between the 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential and the U-shaped distribution of the 
exchange rate within the band.
As for the first implication, a new model has been formulated by Bertola and Svensson 
(1993), hereafter BS, which seeks to fit the data better by relaxing the strong 
assumption of full credibility.
Formally their proposal is to augment the target z.one model by introducing a second 
stochastic process in addition to the traditional fundamentals (such as liquidity and 
activity levels) driving the exchange rale within the band. This additional fundamental 
is also modelled as following a Brownian motion (a sketch of the BS model is 
presented in the appendix to this chapter).
Given the presence of this second driving force, possibly correlated with the other 
economic fundamentals, the relationship between the latter and the exchange rate may 
not resemble that suggested by the Krugman model, the 'S-shaped curve', as Krugman 
and Miller (1993) note. Moreover, the crucial feature of the basic target zone model.
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namely the stabilising effect of the presence of the band, is blurred if not overwhelmed 
by the variations in the expected rate of devaluation.
If the BS model explains the lack of a negative deterministic relationship between the 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential, on the other hand it cannot explain the 
hump-shaped distribution of the exchange rate within the band. A model that explains 
both the lack of a deterministic relationship between the exchange rale and the interest 
rate differential and the hump-shaped exchange rate density has been proposed by 
Lindbcrg and Soderlind (1994b) (LS henceforth).
Contrary to BS, LS assume that the central banks intervene not only when the 
exchange rate hits the band, but also when it is inside the band, i.e. they resort to 
intramarginal intervention. Subject to an appropriate intervention rule, LS show that 
the composite fundamental, given by a linear combination of the traditional 
fundamental and the expected rate of devaluation, does not follow a Brownian motion, 
as in the BS model, but a Omstein-llhlenbeck process (see the appendix to this chapter 
for details). Similarly to BS, however, the expected rale of devaluation is still 
modelled as a Brownian motion process.
As the main purpose of both BS and LS is to offer a well-fitting model of target zones, 
it is important to submit their models to empirical testing and see if they achieve their 
goal. To do this, we note first that introducing a stochastic expected rate of devaluation 
has important implications for the lime series behaviour of the interest rate differential. 
In particular, the specification advanced by both BS and LS implies that the interest 
rate differential is an integrated process. In the case where the alternative is between 
cither maintaining the central parity or realigning, this assumption is, clearly, far from 
being realistic.
In this chapter we exploit the implication of their models to test whether the particular 
behaviour assumed for the rate of expected devaluation is consistent with the data.
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2.2 Expected rate of devaluation and the interest rate differential
In the BS and LS model, it is assumed that agents form their expectations rationally, 
that capital is perfectly mobile and that if any risk premium exists, it is negligible. 
Given these assumptions, the interest rate differential equals the expected change in 
the exchange rate
2.1) i - i* = Et (ds) /  dt 
that is Uncovered Interest Parity holds.
However, as it is assumed that the target zone is not fully credible, the expected 
change of the exchange rate, lit (ds) / dt, is the sum of two terms: first, the expected 
change of the exchange rate within the band, lit (dx) / dt, where x = s - c and c is the 
central parity, and second the expected rate o f realignment, Et (dc) / dt. So
2.2) Et <ds) / dt s  lit (dx) / dl + Et (dc) / dt 
and. given the assumption that UIP holds
2.3) i - i* = lit (dx) / dt + lit (dc) / dt
BS observe that equation 2.3) implies that in order to get an estimate of the expected 
realignment, it is sufficient to get an estimate of the change of the exchange rate within 
the band, and then subtract it from the interest rate differential. Svensson (1991), 
however, observes that such estimation is made difficult by the fact that usually the 
exchange rate within the band, x, jumps at the time of a realignment. This difficulty is 
overcome by conditioning the expected exchange rate within the band upon no 
realignment and hence rewriting 2.3) as follows:
2 . 3 ' ) i  -  i *  =  E t  ( d x  I n r )  /  d t  +  g t
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where gt, the expected rate of devaluation, is the product of the probability of a 
realignment per unit of time, vt , and the expected devaluation size conditional upon 
realignment, Et (dc I r) + Et (dx I r) - Et (dx I nr) 
such that
2.4) gt = vt [ Et (dc I r) + Et (dx I r) - Et (dx I nr)]
(for details see Svensson (1993)).
Even before testing the hypothesis that the expected devaluation follows a random 
walk, it is possible to argue against it. The argument which follows, as well as our 
empirical analysis, is conducted in a discrete time framework, while the theoretical 
analysis is developed in a continuous time framework. The approximation is 
acceptable, however, if one uses high frequency data, as we do in this paper.
Given that the Brownian motion process has its counterpart in discrete time in the 
random walk (with or without drift), it is our purpose to show that, on the basis of the 
assumptions made in the BS and ES models, the expected rate of devaluation, defined 
in equation 2.4), cannot follow such a process.
The argument can be divided into three steps:
i) Unless the exchange rate follows an integrated process of order greater than one, 
the first difference is a stationary process. The empirical literature usually shows that 
the exchange rate, both spot and forward, follows an integrated process of the first 
order (see Meese and Singleton 1982, Meese and Rogoff 1983, Baillie and Bollerslev 
1989, Baillie and McMahon 1989, lie Vries 1994) and hence, by definition, its first 
difference is a stationary process.
ii) If the realised changes of the exchange rale (both total and inside the band) are 
stationary, also their expected counterparts are, if we assume, as BS and ES do, that 
the market is efficient. Indeed, according to the hypothesis of rational expectations
2 . 5 ) S t + j  -  W s t + j l l t )  +  u t + j
4»
(where lt is the information set available at time t), i.e. the realised value of the 
exchange rate at time t+j, st+j, differs from its expected value for an error, ul+j, which 
follows a white noise process if the horizon of the expectations j matches the sampling 
frequency of the data; however, if the frequency of the data is finer than the 
expectation horizon, then ut+j is autocorrelated and follows a moving average process, 
which is, by definition stationary. Given this, the order of integration of the realised 
series has to match the order of integration of the expected series. If this is true, then, 
as the exchange rate follows at most an 1(1) process, also the expected future exchange 
rate does and the first difference is a stationary process.
It is then possible to state that both Et(lJs) and Et(Dx) follow an 1(0) process:
2.6) Et(Ds)~ 1(0), Et(Dxlnr)~l(0)
where Ds = S(+ i - st and Dx = xl+ | - xl
iii) f  rom the discrete time counterpart of equations 2.2), 2.3) and 2.3') it also follows 
that:
2.7) Et(Dxlnr) + gt ~ 1(0)
This is possible only if either Et(l>xlnr) and gt are both l( I) and coinlegrated or if they 
are both 1(0). Hut we have shown above that Et(l)xlnr)~ 1(0), hence gt cannot be an 
integrated process of the first order.
We show empirically that gt is not an I( 1) process in the remainder of the chapter, by 
exploiting the implication that, conditional on the validity of the assumptions staled 
above (i.e. that agents are rational and that the risk premium is negligible), the order of 
integration of the expected rate of devaluation has to match the order of integration of 
the interest rate differential (remembering that the expected change of the exchange
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rale within the band, conditional upon non-realignment, cannot be an integrated 
process) in order to show that gt is actually a stationary process.
Other studies have recently tried to test directly for the order of integration of the 
expected rate of devaluation (see Lindberg, Soderlind and Svensson (1993) and Rose 
and Svensson (1991)). The procedure followed in order to estimate the devaluation 
risk has been proposed by Bertola and Svensson (1993); it has been defined drift- 
adjustment method', as the interest rale differential is adjusted by the drift of the 
exchange rate inside the band in order to get an estimate of the expected devaluation. 
The procedure involves the estimation of the expected change of the exchange rate 
inside the band, Lt(dx)/dt, which is then subtracted from the interest rate differential in 
order to get the expected rale of devaluation. Although in principle the relation 
between the expected change of the exchange rate inside the band and the current 
exchange rate is non-linear, BS suggest that a linear approximation can be acceptable 
for reasonable parameter values. It then follows that, according to the authors, the 
expected change of the exchange rate inside the band can be estimated by applying 
standard econometrics techniques (for applications of this method, see Lindberg, 
Soderlind, Svensson 1993, Svensson 1993, Rose and Svensson 1991).
In order to test for the order of integration of the devaluation expectation, Lindberg, 
Soderlind and Svensson (1993) and Rose and Svensson (1991) apply unit root tests to 
the series obtained by implementing the ’drift adjustment method'.
This procedure has the weakness that there is no agreement on how to measure 
expected future exchange rates inside the band, while the results of the tests do in fact 
depend heavily on how the expected rate of devaluation is estimated. In contrast, in 
this chapter we lest for the order of integration of the expected rale of devaluation by 
using the interest rale differential, which can be observed directly. It must be noted 
that while the theoretical analysis is developed in a continuous time framework, the 
empirical analysis is conducted in a discrete lime framework. The approximation is 
however acceptable if one uses high f requency data, as we do here.
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2.3 Data and empirical analysis
in our empirical analysis we examine both the bilateral target zone given by the KRM 
and the unilateral target zone lor the Swedish krona. The first choice is motivated by 
the fact that the HRM is the most well known target zone and it has lasted for a long 
period of time. We moreover consider the Swedish target zone in order to compare our 
results with those contained in l.indberg and Soderlind (1994 a, b).
For the HRM case, we are going to examine interest rates for one week maturity 
Eurodeposits denominated respectively in Belgian Francs. Danish Krona, Dutch 
Guilders, French Francs and Italian Hire against the corresponding interest rate for 
Hurodeposits denominated in Deutsche Marks. The frequency of sampling is weekly 
and the period examined is February 1987 - March 1992, during which no realignment 
occurred, with the exception of the Italian lira, which was devalued in January 1990 
(at the same time the fluctuation band was narrowed from 6% to 2.25%). The 
quotation refers to the I.ondon market middle rate (source Datastream). The choice of 
the period can be justified on several grounds. First, this is the longest period between 
realignments’, and hence the most suitable to be submitted to a unit root test; second, 
capital controls were present, before 1988, both in France and Italy, thus invalidating 
on of the key assumptions underlying UIF, i.e. perfect capital mobility.
Given that the interest rate differential is assumed to be equal to the sum of the 
expected rate of devaluation and the expected change of the exchange rale within the 
band conditional upon no realignment (see equation 2.3'), in the Italian case we have 
chosen to implement the analysis by splitting the sample into two subperiods and 
dropping the observations immediately before and after the realignment. Note also that 
on the occasion of the realignment of 1990:1:8 the band of fluctuations for the Italian 
lira was narrowed from 6% to 2.25%
For the Swedish case, we use the same data set as Hindbcrg and Soderlind (1994b) for 
comparative purposes, as noted above. In particular, we use daily data for annualised 
simple bid rates on Huro-currency deposits carrying maturity of I and 3 months 
(source: Bank for International Settlements). The interest rates on deposits
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denominated in the basket currency are constructed from the Kuro-deposit rale 
according to the currencies' effective (rather than the official) weights in the Swedish 
currency basket. The period spans from 1985:6:27 (i.e. after the band of fluctuations 
for the Swedish krona was narrowed to 1.5%) to 1990:12:31; a qualification has to be 
kept in mind, however, as capital controls were totally abolished in Sweden only in 
July 1989 and this might have affected the level of interest rates in Eurodeposits 
denominated in Swedish Krona.
Note that while for the HRM case the frequency of the data matches the term of 
maturity for the deposits (1 and 3 month), so that the problem of 'overlapping data' 
arises, causing strong autocorrelation in the series under scrutiny.
In order to examine the order of integration of interest rate differentials, we adopt the 
ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) test (Dickey and Fuller 1979), FP (Phillips and 
Perron) test (Phillips and Perron 1988) and the Johansen procedure to test for 
cointegration (Johansen 1988). Both the ADF and PP tests eliminate the dependency 
of the relevant limiting distributions on the serial correlation structure of the series 
under scrutiny yt. albeit in different ways: ADF does this parametrically, PP non 
parametrically.
As is well known, the ADF consists in the calculation of the t-ratio of a in the
regression
(where yt is the series under scrutiny, A is the first difference operator, k is a constant 
term, t is the trend and ut is the error term) and comparison with the critical values 
reported by Fuller (1976) and MacKinnon (1991). One issue of particular importance 
is the choice of the truncation lag parameter p, as it is often the case that the outcome 
of the test crucially depends on the particular choice of this parameter: while too small 
a truncation lag parameter leads to size distortions of the unit root test because of
2. 8) Ayt = k + a y .^ i + bt +
autocorrelated residuals in equation 2.8), too large a truncation lag parameter results in 
loss of power. In this chapter we start from entering four lags in equation 2.8; we then 
check that no serial correlation is contained in the residuals and, in this case, we test 
for the significance of the fourth lag; where this appears insignificant, regression 2.8 is 
re-estimated including three lags. In all the cases, with the exception of Italy, for the 
first sub period, the third lag appears to be significant and thus an ADF (3) is applied. 
The Perron and Phillips (1988) approach consists of the estimation by least squares of 
one of the following regressions:
2.8’) y t= a y t_ i+ u t
2.8") yt = k + ayt_] + ut
2.8"') yt = k + ayt_) + b (t-T/2) + ut
depending on whether the assumed Data Generation Process (IXiP) is either:
2.9') y t = y t - i + u t
2.9") yt = p + yt-i + u t
and in the second case, if the alternative hypothesis is a stationary process either with 
or without a deterministic trend. The estimates are then corrected by a factor based on 
the structure of the residuals from the estimated regression. The procedure is non- 
paramctric in the sense that there is no need to estimate the nuisance parameters q
0=1.....P)
A Monte Carlo study conducted by Godfrey and Tremayne (1988) shows that for 
finite sample size the ADF lest performs belter than the PP test; in particular, it is 
robust to non-normal, but still i.i.d., or heteroscedaslic errors. However, it performs 
rather poorly if the errors are aulocorrelaled. In the latter case the PP tests are 
preferred, as well as in the heteroscedastic case with a fairly large sample size.
As mentioned above, we perform both tests for both the case of the KRM and the 
Swedish target zone. However, given the size of the data set and the absence or
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presence of the problem of overlapping data, the most appropriate test is respectively 
the ADF test in the first case and the PP in the second.
An alternative approach to the ADF and PP tests is given in a multivariate context by 
the test for cointegration proposed by Johansen (1988), which contains as a special 
case a test for a unit root versus stationary alternatives.
Call z the vector of variables, whose order of integration we want to test and consider 
the VAR model
p-1
2.10) Azt = £  TjAzj.j + nZt.p + 4»Dt + ut
i=i
where n  = a  p', a  is the matrix representing the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, 
and P is the matrix containing the cointegrating vectors, Dt indicates the set of 
deterministic variables to be included in the VAR and p indicates the lag-length 
allowed in the VAR. One question of great importance with respect to testing for 
cointegration in multivariate systems is whether an intercept and trend should enter 
the short- and/or long-run model. Suppose that the only deterministic variables that 
enter the VAR are a constant and a deterministic trend and call z*'t.p = [z't_p 1 t|. 
liquation 2.10) can be rewritten as:
P - \
2.1 O') Azj = £  TjAzt_i + o  | P’ u i SI z*t_p+ aj_ U2 + aj_§21 + Ut
i=i
where aj_ is the orthogonal matrix to a  so that ocjja = 0.
In the case where there are linear trends in the level of the data and there is some long- 
run linear trend which cannot be accounted for by the model, then a time trend is 
allowed to enter the long-run relationship. However, if there is no quadratic trend in
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the level of the variables, the trend does not affect the short-run dynamics and 82 is 
restricted to be zero.
The Johansen procedure allows one to estimate the number of cointegrating vectors 
by estimating the rank of the matrix n  in equation 2.10, or similarly, the rank of afV in 
equation 2.10’) .  In the particular case where the matrix has full rank, all the variables 
under consideration are stationary. Hence, it is possible to examine the order of 
integration of the set of the variables z by calculating the rank of an estimate of the 
matrix n.
As for the choice of entering the constant in either restricted or unrestricted form and 
entering a time trend in the long-run relationship, we decided to enter the constant in 
unrestricted form, due to the trending pattern of the interest rate differentials in the 
period considered in our analysis; moreover. We also decided to include a time trend 
in the long run relationship, as interest rates for different countries converge to the 
German one at different speeds, showing in a different importance of a trend in the 
pattern of interest rate differentials.
As our scries are given by interest rate differentials, it would be reasonable to assume 
that a trend is not present in their behaviour in the long run. However, in the case of 
the liRM, as we are strictly interested in the analysis of the period 1987-1992, which is 
clearly characterised by the presence of a downward trend for all the series, f  rom an 
economic point of view, the presence of a downward trend in the interest rale 
differentials has been commonly interpreted as a sign of increasing credibility in the 
KRM, implying a steady convergence of the nominal interest rales of the liRM 
members to the German rate (see figure 2.1-2.5).
On the contrary, as far as the Swedish target zone is concerned, the hypothesis of the 
presence of a deterministic trend cannot be supported (see figure 6). However, it docs 
not seem appropriate to exclude the possibility of having a deterministic trend in this 
scries on a priori grounds and we implement both the Al )!■ and PI* tests not restricting 
h in equation 2.8) to be equal to zero.
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Generally, in the absenee of any realignment, the presence of the expected rate of 
devaluation implies that any empirical work regarding the UIP or the unbiasedness 
hypothesis of the forward rate faces the 'Peso Problem’, i.e. the expectation of an event 
that does not materialise in the period considered. In particular, there will be a wedge 
between the actual change of the exchange rate (equal to the exchange rate within the 
band) and the interest rate differential, thus invalidating the standard tests of UIP.
The implementation of both the ADF and PP tests shows that the hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root can be rejected in all the cases, with, maybe, the exception of 
13enmark (see table 2.1).
When the ADF test is adopted, the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root cannot 
be rejected for Denmark, is rejected at 10% significance level for Belgium, and (at 
least) at 5% significance level in the other cases. When the PP test is used, however, 
the null is rejected for all the series considered. The failure for the ADF' test to reject 
the null for Denmark can he explained hy observing that for several months in 1988: 
the series appears to be shifted downward. It is well known that the ADF test has very 
low power when the alternative hypothesis is a stationary series with one (or more) 
structural breaks (see Perron 1989, 1990 and Flendry and Neale 1991).
In order to find an explanation for the drift in the series, it is necessary to examine the 
behaviour of the single series of the interest rates on Hurodeposils expressed in Danish 
Krona and Deutsche marks (figure 2.3) and to refer to the kind of monetary policy 
implemented in the two countries at that time. By looking at the graph of the two 
series, it is possible to infer that while the strong decrease in the interest rate 
differential in May 1988 was due to an increase in the German interest rates that was 
not followed by the Danish ones (also in January 1989 the Danish interest rates did not 
follow the German ones), the sharp increase in September was due to a strong increase 
in the level of the Danish interest rates, due to the expectations of a realignment in the 
KRM and in particular of a devaluation of the Danish krona against the Deutsche 
Mark.
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We finally adopt the Johansen test for cointegration for the variables considered in the 
chapter with the exception of the interest rate differential between Denmark and 
Germany, which seems to be affected by two structural breaks.
For the reasons given above we included in the system an unrestricted constant and a 
restricted trend. The results (see table 2.2) show that both the trace and the maximum 
eigenvalue statistics cannot reject the hypothesis of the presence of four cointegrating 
vectors, which implies that all the series of the system are stationary. The result is 
supported by inspecting the graphs of the four cointegrating vectors, which do not 
show any sign of nonstationarity (figure 2.8).
Also for Sweden, the results of both the ADF and PF tests for the one and three 
months interest rate differential show that the hypothesis of the presence of a unit root 
can be rejected; however, in this case the alternative hypothesis that seems most likely 
to hold is that of a stationary process without a deterministic trend (see table 2.3a and 
2.3b).
For both the lag length chosen (5 and 10), Z(®3) shows a strong rejection of the null 
hypothesis (Fly: b=0 and a=l in equation 2.8’")) for any significant level; moreover, 
the t-statistics for b and a show that while the first is not significant, the second is 
significant and strongly so (also the t-statistics for k is significant). As Perron (1988) 
suggests, given that a rejection of the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in 
this case is possible, there is no need to go further. These results support the 
hypothesis that the series is stationary and that it does not contain a significant trend 
component.
This result is particularly interesting for two reasons: firstly, the assumption that the 
expected rate of devaluation follows a random walk has proved not to hold empirically 
not only for the case of the KRM, but also for the Swedish target zone. Secondly, the 
rejection of the unit root hypothesis for the interest rate differential holds despite the 
fact that we use exactly the same data set and period as l.indberg and Soderlind 
(1994b), who argue that their empirical analysis supports their theoretical model.
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We are then quite confident in dismissing as unrealistic the hypothesis that, when the 
only alternative to maintaining the central parity is a realignment, the rate oi expected 
devaluation, and hence the interest rate differential, follows an integrated process of 
the first order, both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
2.4: Conclusions and extensions
From the integration accounting given above, it follows that both the BS and the LS 
proposals imply a unit root in interest rate differentials. But this is rejected by the data. 
So, these models do not seem to offer a satisfactory explanation of the behaviour of 
the exchange rate in presence of non fully credible target zones.
The statistical properties of the hypothesised rate of expected rate of devaluation 
could, of course, always be reformulated to fit the data. But to do this means that one 
is defining as devaluation risk all that cannot be explained in terms of fundamentals 
and uncovered interest parity, without testing any meaningful hypothesis. A better 
approach would be to specify and test a theory of what economic factors are associated 
with realignments and hence with the expected rate of devaluation.
As mentioned above, the time series behaviour of the interest rate differential clearly 
shows a downward trend in all the cases considered. By recalling equation 2.3'), it is 
clear that 'raw interest rate differentials can be very misleading indicators of 
realignment expectations' (Svensson 1991), given the presence (in the interest rate 
differential) of the expected change of the exchange rate within the band. However, it 
seems plausible to assume that the trending pattern of the interest rate differentials 
carries over to the rate of expected devaluation.
Such pattern can be explained by the model of learning recently proposed by Driffill 
and Miller (1993). In their framework, agents use Bayesian updating to revise their 
beliefs about the arrival rate of a realignment, which can be either high or low. If no 
devaluation occurs, the probability that the public attach to the low arrival rale to be 
the true one increases and so the expected rate of occurrence of a realignment (which 
is a weighted average of the two arrival rates) decreases. Conversely, when a
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realignment occurs, the expected rate of devaluation rises sharply. This is clearly not 
what one usually observed after realignments in the early '80s.
A qualification, however, is that the same negative trending pattern cannot be traced in 
the Swedish case; moreover, the model cannot explain the sharp increase in the interest 
rate differentials, and the subsequent exit of Italy and the UK from the KRM.
We conclude, therefore, that discriminating tests of a theory of realignments will 
need to be tested on a data set which goes back earlier than 1987 and includes periods 
after realignments.
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Appendix to chapter 2
In the present section our aim is to present the main elements of the Bertola and 
Svensson and the Lindberg and Soderlind models, stressing the role of the assumption 
that the expected rate of devaluation follows a Brownian motion.
BS express, as is standard in target zone models, the current level of the exchange rate, 
S(. as depending on the level of the 'fundamentals', ft, and on a forward looking term, 
given by the expected change in the exchange rate, Kt (ds)/dt:
a 2.1) st = fj + a  Ht (ds)/dt
It is assumed that f( follows a stochastic process of the kind:
a 2.2) dft = pf dt + o  dWf + dl.(t) - dU(t) + dct
where W is a standard Wiener process, I.(t) and U(t) are non decreasing, continuous 
processes, which increase only when the exchange rale hits the lower or the upper 
boundary of the band, and whose movements are necessary to hold the exchange rate 
inside the band of fluctuation, f inally, the process ct, where ct indicates the central 
parity, is assumed to be a jump process, with jumps which lake place at the time of a 
realignment.
It is possible to define two new variables as the deviation of the fundamentals and the 
exchange rate from the central parity:
a 2.3) xt = st - ct f" = l't - C(
Moreover, call the size of the exchange rate jump parity at the time of a realignment z.t 
and assume that the position of the exchange rate inside the band remains unchanged 
when a realignment occurs, such that / \  expresses also the jump in the central parity 
(at the realignment).
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Assuming that the probability of a realignment to occur is equal to pt, the expected 
rate of devaluation is equal to:
a 2.4) gt = (1/dt) ( pt Et (zt I r)) = vt z,
It is also possible to relax the assumption that the exchange rate inside the band does 
not move at the time of a realignment, along the lines of l.indberg, Svensson and 
Soderlind (1991). In this case z(t) can be expressed as:
a 2.5) z ,  = l;t <(dc 1 r) /cU + <xt+ d t1 r) - (xt+dt1 nr>)
As mentioned in the main text of this note, BS assume that gt follows a Brownian 
motion process, of the sort:
a 2.6) d gt = pg dl + a g dWg
following from the above equations, it is possible to express the expected change of 
the exchange rate as:
a 2.7) (ds)/dl = Et (dx)/dl + g(
It is then possible to rewrite equation a 2 .1) as: 
a 2.1') s (f, g) = f(l) + a  g( + a  fy <dx)/dt
and by subtracting the value of the central parity both from the left and the right hand
side
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a 2.8) x (f°, g) = f° (t) + a  gt + a  Kt (dx)/dt
By defining the new state variable
a 2.9) ht = f°(t) + a  gt
whieh follows a Brownian motion process, being the sum of two Brownian motion
processes,
it is then possible to reformulate the model as:
with boundary conditions:
x ( h )  = x x(h) = x  x \ h )  = x'(h) = 0
It turns out that the solution is fully analogous to that proposed by Krugman (1991) for 
a fully credible target /.one and that an S-shaped relationship exists between ht and xt.
We noticed in the main text that, according to LS, the composite fundamental follows 
a Omstein-Uhlenbcck process, while the expected rate of devaluation is still modelled 
as a Brownian motion. This is obtained as follows:
a 2.11) P t = vt + nt + agt
both vt and gt are assumed to follow a Brownian motion process and to be 
independent; moreover, contrary to BS, g( is assumed to follows a Brownian motion 
without drift.
a 2.10) x (h) = ht + a  Ht (dx)/dt
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a 2.12) dgt = CTgdWg
a 2.13) d(vt + ag t) = dWt
a 2.14) o  = V(av + aCTg)
The policy rule is specified as:
a 2.15) dnt = -P (ht - h°)dt + dl. - dU
where dF>0 for h=/t and dU><) only if h=h 
and h and h are the boundaries of the band for ht.
According to LS, h° corresponds to a preferred exchange rate level within the band, 
x°=x(h°) and P is a constant positive policy parameter.
From the equations above, it follows that the composite fundamental follows, in the 
interior of the band, the Omstein-Uhlenbeck process:
a 2.16) dht = -P< ht- h°)dt + adWt
Compared to both the Krugman and the BS model, this formulation implies that the 
drift parameter is not constant, but it is variable and that ht is a mean reverting process 
also without interventions at the boundaries.
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Table 2.1a: PP test 
ERM Eurocurrencies 
2.1987 3.1992 
1 week maturity
In terest rate 
d ifferen tia l
L a g s la a>3
B F /D M 4 5.64* -6.14* -5.32 18.92*
D G /D M 4 6.72* -8.96* -6.04 40.13*
D K /D M 4 3 33** -3.76* -3.40 7.08**
F F /D M 4 4.73* -5.06* -4.67 12.79*
L IT /D M i 4 7.23* -7.39* -3.18 27.28*
L IT /D M ? 4 5.37* -5.82* -1.79 16.99*
* significant at 2.5%
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 10%
All the statistics refer to the model 2.5’") 
Z(t^) tests for the significance of k
Z(ta ) tests for the significance of a 
Z(tp) tests for the significance of b 
Z(<1>3) tests jointly for a=l and b=0
Table 2.1b: ADF test 
ERM Eurocurrencies 
2.1987 3.1992 
1 week maturity
Interest rate 
differential
Lags la <J>-}
BF/DM 3 2.93*** -3.42*** -2.9** 5.97***
DG/DM 3 2.58 -3.52** -2.48*** 6.23***
DK/DM 3 1.93 -2.47 -2.06 3.12
FF/DM 1 3.60* -3.92* -3.64* 7.67*
LIT/DM i 2 • 3.98* -4.05* -2.29 8.23*
LIT/DM? 4 3.63* -3.87* -1.25 7.55*
* significant at 2.5%
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 10%
All the statistics refer to model 2.5) 
t^ tests for the significance of k
ta  tests for the significance of a
tp tests for the significance of b
<1>3 tests for the joint significance of a and b
Table 2.2: Johansen test for cointegration 
for interest rate differentials 
2 lags included
62
Hq: rank=r L R  test based upon L R  test based upon
max eigenvalue trace
r=0 47.19** 111.3**
r < = l 28.63** 64.16**
r<=2 23.13** 35.53**
r<=3 12.4* 12.4*
**: significant at 1% level 
*: significant at 5% level
Table 2.3a: PP test
Swedish Eurocurrencies against basket 7.1985 12.1990 
1 month maturity
Lags Z(tjx) Z(ta> zap) Z(d>3)
10 3.79* -4.36* 1.35 10.46*
5 3.76* -4.33* 1.37 10.36*
Table 2.3b: PP test
Swedish Eurocurrencies (against basket) 7.1985 12.1990 
3 month maturity
Lags ZOji) Z0o) Z( tp) Z(d>3)
10 3.66* - 4.12* 2.14 10.11*
5 3.66* • -4.13* 2.13 10.12*
* significant at 2.5%
** significant at 5%
Table 2.4a: ADF test
Swedish Eurocurrencies (against basket) 7.1985 12.1990 
1 month maturity
6.1
Lags la CP O3
0 3.77* -4.35* 1.36* 10.41*
Table 2.4b: ADF test
Swedish Eurocurrencies (against basket) 7.1985 12.1990
Lags la lP * 3
l 3.77* -4.35* 1.36* 10.41*
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Chapter 3:
A model of the Currency Crisis of 1992: The Case of the British Pound and
the Italian Lira
3.1 Introduction
The currency crisis that hit most of the LRM currencies and caused the exit of the 
Italian Lira and the British Pound from the System has been a crucial topic of research 
in the last two years. Several models have been proposed to explain the episode, each 
focusing on a different aspect of the crisis.
One strand of the literature (e.g. Masson 1994) has stressed the importance of the 
trade-off between exchange rate stability and unemployment facing a government and 
the opposite effect that high unemployment has on the credibility of the commitment 
of the government to defend the parity of its currency. Masson shows that a high 
unemployment level can have opposite implications for expectations of a future 
devaluation, and hence for the interest rate differential: on one hand it signals a 'tough' 
Government, strongly committed to defend its parity; on the other hand, if 
circumstances become too unfavourable, it makes the task too difficult, in such a way 
that also a government strongly committed to defend the parity is forced to realign. 
Another strand of the literature (c.g. Ozkan and Sutherland 1994) has focused on the 
nature of the switch between a fixed and a Boating exchange rate system as an 
optimising decision of the government, in order to loosen monetary policy and boost 
aggregate demand, and not as an action forced on the government. However, the 
agents in the foreign exchange market know the government's objective function and 
include the expectation of the switch of regime in their expectations, which are then 
reflected in the interest rate differential. The authors also show that the agents' 
knowledge of the government's objective function induces the regime switch to take 
place earlier than the time preferred by the government.
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Several papers have also focused on the empirical aspects of the crisis (Rose 1993, 
Rose and Svensson 1993, Thomas 1994), but their results are far from being 
conclusive, on how and why the crisis took place.
The aspect which we want to analyse in this chapter is the role of the willingness (or 
unwillingness) of the Bundesbank in supporting the currencies under attack for the 
agents’ expectations of the future exchange rate and, hence, the viability of the system. 
A close reading of the financial press of the time stresses the fact that the agents used 
the stance of the German central bank as a signal on the viability and the sustainability 
of the system; although this element of the crisis has been raised before (Kenen 1994), 
there is no formal theoretical model which captures this aspect in the literature to date. 
The degree of the willingness on the side of the Bundebank to support the weak 
currencies is strongly linked to the implications of this manoeuvre on the level of the 
money supply and its growth for Germany if the manoeuvre remains unsterili/ed. The 
stance of the Bundesbank to contain money supply is well known and so it is not 
surprising that the market questioned the validity of the commitment on the side of the 
Bundesbank to intervene for any required amount.
This can be seen as the 'political economy' aspect of the framework proposed in this 
chapter. There are two major differences with the models that focus on the political 
economic aspect of the crisis: first, the preferences of the 'strongest' country in the 
System, Germany, are not modelled in terms of a welfare function, but are taken into 
account as a dislike of an increase of the money supply beyond the target. Secondly, 
while in the models of the first type unemployment covers a major role, entering, 
either directly or indirectly, the government's welfare function, in the model proposed 
in this chapter unemployment does not have any role to play. The reason for this is 
that the theoretical framework for our model is the monetary model of exchange rale 
determination with flexible prices, where it is assumed that output is set exogenously 
at the full employment level.
The models that focus on political economy issues, moreover, analyse the case of a 
switch between a fixed exchange rate system and a free float, while in this chapter a
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switch between a two-sided target zone and a free float is examined. This seems closer 
to the nature of the KRM, where currencies are allowed to move within a fluctuation 
band.
The model proposed here is a modified version of the model of the gold standard 
proposed by Krugman and Rotemberg (1992) and Fella (1993).
The second section of the chapter will outline the basic model of the gold standard by 
Krugman and Rotemberg and describe how the model can be extended to the target 
zone case. The third section is devoted to the description of our model and in the 
fourth section we will outline its empirical implications the model proposed will be 
the topic of the forth section. The conclusion also contains the proposal for a further 
extension of the model.
3.2: The Krugman and Rotemberg Model of the gold standard
The basic target zone model, proposed by Krugman ( 1991a) and all the models of the 
so-called 'second generation' (Bertola and Caballero 1992, Bertola and Svensson 1993, 
I.indberg and Soderlind, 1993, and Tristani 1994) implicitly assume that the amount of 
reserves available in order to defend the parity of the currencies in the system is 
unlimited.
This assumption seemed compatible with the characteristic of the FRM, giving that the 
Act of Foundation of the FMS states that support to currencies which approach the 
weak edge of the band is unlimited ('...These interventions shall be unlimited at the 
compulsory intervention rates...'. Document 8, Section 1, Article 2.2); moreover, with 
the Agreement of Basle-Nyborg in September 1987, it was agreed that the access to 
the Very Short Term Financial Facilities was extended in use and duration.
However, in December 1978, in a hearing to the Bundestag, the German Finance 
Minister stated that '...the Bundesbank has the responsibility to intervene and the 
option not to intenene if it is its opinion that it is not able to do so' (italics added).
The events of the Summer 1992 showed that the amount of reserves available for the 
countries whose currencies were subject to a speculative attack was actually an issue
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and that the central bank of the centre country, the Bundesbank, was not actually 
prepared to intervene for unlimited sums in defence of these currencies. For this 
reason, it seems necessary to extend the target zone model in order to incorporate 
limited reserves.
The issue of limited reserves has been studied extensively in the two-countries model 
of the gold standard proposed by Krugman and Rotemberg (1992) (henceforth KR).
In their model, the fixed exchange rate system is seen as a boundary between two one­
sided target zones. The focus here is of course of the limited nature of the amount of 
reserves available to the two countries, whose sum is equal to the quantity of gold 
available in the system, and how this can cause a collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
system to a floating one. Kach country has a fixed parity for the price of gold, and so 
the exchange rate between the two countries is fixed (see figure 3.1).
The model analyses the behaviour of the exchange rate between the two currencies as 
one of the two countries runs out of reserves (which implies that the other countries 
owns almost all the gold in the system).
The agents know that once a country runs out of reserves, it cannot defend the parity 
of its currency any longer and is forced to float. The authors show that in the event the 
switch to a Boating regime is a reversible one, this takes place for values of the 
velocity shock which differ compared to the case of an irreversible switch.
The model can be summarised as follows.
First consider the equation of the exchange rate:
3.1) s = m - m* + v + a  fij (ds/dt)
s is the log of the exchange rate between the currencies of the two countries 
m (m*) is the log of domestic (foreign) money supply
v is a velocity shock, which follows a Brownian motion process (without drift)
3.2) dv = o  dz
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a  is the semi-elasticity of the money demand to interest rate
Kt (ds/dt) is the instantaneous expected change of the exchange rate, which is equal to 
zero in a fixed exchange rate system with no expectations of a future jump in the 
exchange rate 
m (m*) can be written as:
3.3) m = log (D + R)
D (1)*) is the level of domestic credit for the domestic (foreign) country
R (R*) is the level of reserves for the domestic (foreign) country
The sum of the reserves belonging to the domestic and the foreign country is equal to
the amount of gold available in the system
The monetary authorities of the two countries commit themselves to defend the fixed 
exchange rate until they run out of reserves, when they are forced to leave the 
exchange rate floating. The additional assumption that Krugman and Rotemberg make 
is that the country which has run out of reserves, commit itself to buy gold at the par 
value when there is the possibility to do so, thus reinstating the gold standard.
The boundaries of the gold standard are given by the two free float loci each 
corresponding to a total loss of reserves for one country (FF and F’F' in figure 3.1).
In particular, the free float locus when the domestic country has run out of reserves is:
(m* = log (D* + R*))
3.4) G = R + R*
3.5)
(this is the line FF in figure 1)
while the free float locus corresponding to the total loss of reserves by the foreign 
country is:
3.5') s = ln(
D+G
D*
) + v
(this is the line F F  in figure 3.1).
However, given that the switch between the gold standard and the float is reversible, 
the float is not totally free, but it can be seen as a one-sided target zone.
As figure 1 shows, for values of the velocity shock smaller than v^, the exchange rate 
float, but when v reaches v^, then the gold standard is reinstated, and so the par value. 
Likewise, for values of v greater than vp, the exchange rate floats, but if v becomes 
smaller than vp, the gold standard is reinstated, and so the par value.
This implies that, for values of the velocity shock smaller (or equal) than v(1 the 
exchange rate will be smaller or equal to the fixed exchange rate (corresponding to the 
par value of the gold); for values of v greater or equal to vA the exchange rale will be 
greater or equal to the fixed exchange rate.
The prospect of returning to the gold standard either sustain (in the unilateral target 
zone A) or depresses (under the target zone B) the value of the exchange rate, 
compared to the corresponding free float values.
In order to find the equation that characterises the two one-sided target zones, the 
exchange rate is expressed as a twice-continuous function of the velocity shock v. 
(liven that the velocity shock follows a driftless Brownian motion, it is possible to 
apply Ito’s lemma and obtain the following second order differential equation:
3.6) s(v) = (m - m*) + v + (1/2) o2s"(v)
which has solution:
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3.7) s (v) = (m - m*) + v + Ai erv + A2 e 'rv
where +/- r are the roots of the characteristic equation (with r > 0)and A] and A2 are 
arbitrary constants to be determined.
in order to pin down A] and A2 , boundary conditions must be used, 
hirst, consider the unilateral target zone A: the value of v is unbounded from below, 
hence A2 = 0. Secondly, for v = vA the exchange rate must be equal to the par value, in 
order to satisfy the non-arbitrage condition.
and so, the equation describing the behaviour of the exchange rale in the unilateral 
target zone A (see figure 3.1) is:
(given that the relative money supply when the domestic country has all the gold is
3.8) S (vA ) =  Spar
For the same reason, the smooth pasting condition has to hold for v = vA,
.3.9) s'(vA)=  1 + r A| g™* = 0
The value of A| is then
3.10) A, = - ( 1/r) (>
.3.11) , , r(v-v.)) + v - (1/r) £
equal to ln(—— In a similar way, it can be shown that the equation characterising
the exchange rate under the unilateral target zone B is:
71
3.12) s(v) = In + v + (1/r) e  (v v*’
(given that the relative money supply when the foreign country has all the gold is 
D
equal to In ( ^ 7 ^ ) .
It is important to stress two characteristics of this model, which are going to be 
recalled later in the chapter.
First, at the time of the switch from the fixed regime to the unilateral target zone A (B) 
there is a discrete loss of reserves from the foreign (domestic) to the domestic 
(foreign) country. The reason for the loss of reserves is given by what follows: while 
under the gold standard the expected change of the exchange rate is equal to zero, 
under the target zone A (B) the exchange rate is expected to appreciate (depreciate) 
and hence at the edges of the gold standard there will be a sudden purchase (sale) of 
the domestic currency by means of a sale of gold reserves.
Secondly, the switch between the unilateral target zone and the gold standard can be 
seen as a state-contingent condition, i.e. the switch takes place once the velocity shock 
reaches vA (vB). As a consequence, in order to avoid the possibility of infinitely large 
gains, the exchange rate before and after the switch needs to be the same, i.e.
3.13) s(vA.) = s(vA+)
3.13’)s (v B.) = s(vB+)
where a + indicates the 'after-collapse' regime, while a - indicates a 'pre-collapse'
regime.
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The framework proposed by Kingman and Rotemberg has been extended hy Fella 
(1993) in order to analyse the issue of limited reserves in the framework of a fully 
credible two-sided target zone, instead than in a gold standard.
The free float lines, as well as the unilateral target zones are the same, and so have the 
same equations, as the ones in the Krugman and Rotemberg model. The difference lies 
in the state-contingent conditions of the switch between, in this framework, the two- 
sided and the one-sided target zone (see figure 3.2).
The two free float lines determine the area of sustainability of the two-sided target 
zone, in the case the switch to a floating exchange rate is irreversible. In the case of a 
reversible switch, the area of sustainability is limited within vA and vB.
The S-shaped curve (which characterises the two-sided target zone) position inside this 
area is given by the level of the relative money supply. The money supply, in turn, 
changes once one of the two boundaries of the fluctuation band is hit and the 
authorities are forced to intervene (when the country whose currency is weak looses 
gold in favour of the country whose currency is strong).
Consider first a reversible switch to floating exchange rates: this takes place in 
correspondence of the value of the velocity shock where the exchange rate inside the 
band has reached the upper (lower) boundary (of the fluctuation band) and this equals 
the exchange rate, for the same velocity shock, under the one-sided target zone where 
the foreign (domestic) country has all the gold available in the system. The values of 
vA (vB) can be determined by solving the following equation:
3.14) vA+ (m - m*) + At 4 + A2 e  rVA = vA + ln( ) - (1/r)
and
3.14') vB + (m - m*)' + A |g rv" + A2£> rv* = vB + ln( + ( 1/r)
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where vA and vB are the only unknowns in the equations above (A] and A2 have the 
same values as in the original target zone model (Krugman 1991a)).
Because the smooth-pasting condition has been imposed on both the two-sided target 
zone and the two one-sided target zones at the boundary, then these curves smooth 
paste to each other.
On the contrary, if the switch is between the two-sided target zone and an irreversible 
float, then the smooth-pasting does not take place, while the value matching condition 
still holds). Moreover, it can be shown that the values of the velocity shock in 
correspondence of which the change in regime takes place, vA’ and vB' , are 
respectively smaller, the first, and bigger, the second, than the corresponding values if 
the switch is reversible.
This framework has been extended by the same author to include the possibility for the 
country which has run out of reserves to borrow reserves from the other country in the 
system. This implies that the area of sustainability of the two-sided target zone is 
wider compared to the non-borrowing case (see figure 3.3).
Suppose that the domestic country is running out of reserves, but the agents attach a 
given probability, k, that the monetary authorities of the foreign country will grant a 
loan of size C, in case there is an attack on the domestic currency. In other words, at 
the time of the attack, the target zone will be defended, and the loan granted, with 
probability k; the zone will not be defended, and the exchange rate will be forced to 
float, with probability (1-A.). In each case, at the time of the attack the exchange rate 
will jump, to the value corresponding to the one-sided target zone if the loan is not 
granted, and to a new two-sided fully credible target zone if the loan has been granted. 
The value of the velocity shock that triggers the speculative attack can be found by 
exploiting the non-arbitrage condition, so that the exchange rate before the attack 
equals its expected value after the attack. This, in turns, equals the weighted average of 
the exchange rate in the case the exchange rate is defended (and so the target zone is 
preserved) and the one when the exchange rate is forced to float.
Supposing that the switch to the float is reversible, this implies:
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3.15) s(vc .) = X P'Q' + (1 - X) PR'
If the domestic currency is attacked and the loan is granted, then the target /.one is 
going to be sustainable until the velocity shock reaches a level where also the loan has 
been depleted and the currency is forced to float, in which case the relative money 
supply equals:
m - m* = In ((1) - s C) / (D*+G+C))
As in the model by Krugman and Rotemberg, also in this framework the switch to the 
float is a state-contingent condition. This implies that, in order to satisfy the non­
arbitrage condition, the exchange rate before the switch is either equal to the one 
prevailing alter that or to the weighted average of the two possible level of the 
exchange rate which takes place after the attack, as it was said above.
The consequence of these assumptions and conditions is that, before the switch, the 
behaviour of the exchange rate is perfectly identical to the case where there is an 
unlimited amount of reserves available in the system and, hence, the target zone is 
sustainable for any value of the velocity shock. If this is true, also the interest rate 
differential (given by the vertical distance between the exchange rate along the S- 
shaped curve and the corresponding free float locus) will have exactly the same 
behaviour if reserves are either limited or unlimited.
3 A target zone model with an overdraft facility
The implications of the models described above, however, do not seem very consistent 
with the evolution of the interest rate differentials before the Italian l.ira and the 
British Pound were forced to leave the Kuropcan Monetary System. The interest rate 
differentials for the Italian lira started increasing rapidly after the no vote to Maastricht 
in Denmark in June 1992 and the ones for the British Pound increased towards the end 
of the summer. For these reasons, it seems important to formalise a model of the target 
zones, in the phases preceding its collapse, which generates positive interest rates
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differentials between Italy and Britain, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other 
hand, before the fall as an implication.
As it was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, one aspect of the crisis of the 
liRM which has been overlooked in the theoretical literature is the role of the altitude 
of the Bundesbank to intervene in defence of the weak currencies of the system as a 
signal of the sustainability of the system. The model will focus on this aspect. It is 
important to stress that the model proposed here can only offer a partial explanation of 
the HRM crisis. In particular, it is not possible to address issues related to the pressure 
on the exchange rate parities given by an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which 
Italy experienced before the crisis; this is due to the fact that our framework is based 
on the monetary model with flexible prices, which assumes that Purchasing Power 
Parity holds continuously. Furthermore, the model does not have anything to say on 
the role of unemployment, as it is assumed that output is fixed at full employment 
level.
It was shown above that by imposing a state-contingent condition (so that for given 
known values of the velocity shock there will be a switch of regime), it is necessary 
that the exchange rate after the switch (or its expected value) is equal to the exchange 
rate before the switch, in order to satisfy the non-arhitrage condition.
In order to relax this restriction without violating the non-arhitrage condition, it seems 
preferable to drop the state-contingent condition and view the switch to the float as a 
probabilistic event. This approach also implies the presence of a 'peso problem' (i.e. 
the expectation of an event which does not take place in-sample), before the fall, for 
the weak currency, which is obviously a very important factor before the lira and the 
pound were forced to Boat.
For reasons of simplicity, the model does not lake into account the possibility of a 
realignment, but focuses on the switch of regime between the target /.one and the free 
float, l or the same reason, an irreversible switch is considered, in order to keep a 
simple analytical framework. It would he interesting to extend the model to an
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environment where realignments can take place and the switch to the float is 
reversible.
As in the KR framework, the model is a two-country one. It is also assumed that once 
the domestic country has run out of disposable reserves, the monetary authorities of 
the foreign country, Germany, agrees to grant a loan of, possibly, an unlimited 
amount. The loan, however, can be called back at any time, in other words an 
'overdraft facility' is in place. If the loan is called back, the target zone becomes 
unsustainable and the exchange rate is forced to float; moreover, the relative money 
supply jumps to the level where the foreign country money supply equals its domestic 
credit and all the gold in the system, while the domestic country's money supply equals 
its domestic credit (as in the previous models, both D and I)* are assumed to be 
constant).
It is assumed that the probability for the loan to being called back follows a Poisson 
process with (constant) arrival rate equal to p, so that in the time interval dt the loan 
will be recalled with probability pdt and it will be continued to be granted with 
probability (1 - pdt). Note that this is a simplification of the model. In reality, loans 
between central banks cannot be called back. However, the framework proposed in 
this chapter can be reinterpreted as assuming that the loan has infinitesimal duration 
and that the probability of renewal follows a Poisson process, where p is the 
probability for the loan not to be renewed.
The model proposed in this chapter has some similarities with the target zone model 
by Dumas el al. (1993), who model the probability of a realignment as a Poisson 
process; when the realignment takes place, the central parity is shifted upwards onto 
the free float line with the same money supply and the exchange rate is adjusted 
correspondingly; at the time of the realignment there is no change in the money supply 
of in the fluctuation limits of the fundamentals.
In our model, similarly to the models outlined above, the exchange rate behaviour can 
be expressed by the equation;
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3.1) s(v) = (m - m*) + v + a H t (ds/dt)
The difference with the models outlined in the previous section lies in the expression 
Et (ds/dt). In the Krugman and Rotemberg model, when the gold standard prevails, the 
instantaneous expected change of the exchange rate is equal to zero; in the Fella 
model, , the equation for the target zone is the same as the one of the original 
Krugman target zone model (where there is no concern for limited reserves) in the area 
between the two float loci, and so also the expected change of the exchange rate is the 
same as in the fully credible target zone.
In the model proposed in this chapter, however, iit(ds/dt) has two components, the 
first given by the expected change inside the band, the second given by the expected 
change if the loan is called back, and so the exchange rate jumps to the free float 
value. Then, the exchange rate after the jump to the free float locus equals:
Then, equation 3.1) will become (by ignoring the terms in dt2 and rearranging):
3.18) s(v) =(m - m*) + ap  [ln(D/(D* + () )))  +v - s(v)|+v + (a/2) o2 svv
3.16) + v
(where the sign + indicates the after-collapse regime) 
so the expected jump if the loan is called back equals:
3.17)
D
s+(v) - s(v) = In p - — + V - s(v)
and so:
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3.19) s(v) = (1 + ap)_1((m - m*) + ap  ln(D/(D* + G ))) +v + (1+ a p )-1 (a/2) a 2svv 
This equation is a second-order differential equation and has the following solution:
, D
3.20) s(v) = (1 + a p ) ' ( (m  - m*) + ap In— —— ) + v + A'] erv + A 2 e'rv
D*+G
(where a ' indicates that the arbitrary constants and the roots of the characteristic 
equation refer to the target zone with an overdraft facility)
+/- r' are the roots of the characteristic equation:
.3.21) (1 + ap)-'(a /2 ) a 2 r2 - 1 = 0
and are equal to
3.22) r’ = +/- (2 (1 + ap) / a a 2)l/2
r' is greater, in absolute value, than the root of the characteristic equation for the basic 
Krugman model of a fully credible target zone (Krugman 1991), equal to 
r = +/- (2/a o 2),/2
Boundary conditions in the form of smooth pasting conditions at the boundaries of the 
fluctuation band for the velocity shock need to be imposed in order to determine the 
arbitrary constants A'( and A'2.
As in this type of models it is assumed that interventions are of infinitesimal si/e, e ' 
and v ’ are uniquely determined by the condition that:
3.23) s(v') — s and s(y') = .y
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where s (5 ) is the upper (lower) limit of the fluctuation band for s. Moreover, it 
can be shown that the exchange rate hand is symmetric and so s = - s .
The family of curves corresponding to equation 3.20) has the well-known S-shaped 
form (see figure 3.4). The consequence of taking into account the possibility that the 
overdraft facility can be recalled at any time is both a shift of the curve to the left and 
a change o f  the curvature of the curve itself (see the appendix to this chapter for a 
proof), compared to the fully credible target zone.
Note that given the assumptions of the model, the whole family of curves lies at the 
right of the free float locus where the exchange rate jumps if the loan is called back 
(line FF in figure 3.4), which is described by the equation
The fact that the whole family of curves O FT/ (overdraft facility target zone) lies at 
the right o f the free float locus can be shown by making explicit the expression (m - 
m*), i.e. the relative money supply once the overdraft facility is in place, in equation 
3.19) and 3.20)
3.16)
The line crosses the v-axis for
D
.3.24)
3.25) (m - m*)OKr/ = In
D - L  
D*+G + L
where L represents the loan in use at a given time. 
Giving that L > 0, it follows that
3.26) (m - m*)OKr/ < (m - m*)K-r/
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D -L D
3.26’) < In
D*+G
i.e. under a target zone with an overdraft facility the relative money supply is smaller 
than under a fully credible target zone (FCTZ).
Note that s(v) will cross the v-axis at \ q , such that, by recalling equation 3.26'
and so the family of ’Overdraft Facility Target Zone’ (OI TZ) will lie to the right of the 
free float locus (see figure 4).
The fact that the money supply is smaller under an overdraft facility target zone, i.e. 
when the central bank of the domestic country is using up the loan granted by the 
foreign country, and that once the loan is called back the relative money supply 
increases (thus generating a devaluation) can be explained as follows: 
suppose that the Hank of Italy (the domestic bank) intervenes to defend the lira by 
selling DM made available through a loan by the Bundesbank; this will, in absence of 
offsetting operations either in the foreign exchange or capital markets, have an equal 
effect of opposite sign in the money markets of the two countries: contractionary in 
Italy and expansionary in Germany (see Mastropasqua et al. 1988).
Conversely, when the loan is paid back, the money supply in Italy will increase and 
the one in Germany will decrease.
The size of the relative money supply after the loan is called back will be exactly the 
same as the one before the loan was started being used.
3.27) V(j = - (l+ap)’ *|ln
D -L D
D*+G+L
Moreover, v(j lies at the right of v^, as:
D*+G + L
D -L
D
3.29) m - m* = In -; ■■■■■-— 
D*+G
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Having established the characteristics of the target zone with an overdraft facility, we 
need to analyse how, as a consequence of cumulative velocity shocks, the system 
moves from a fully credible target zone (FCTZ) to a target zone with an overdraft 
facility (OFTZ), recalling that the central bank of the foreign country agrees with 
certainty to make a loan to the central bank of the domestic country in order to defend 
its currency.
The switch between the two will take place once the domestic country has completely 
run out of reserves, so that
3.29) m - m* = In
D
D*+C
and the exchange rate hits the upper bound of the band, so that an intervention to keep 
it inside the band is needed. I^t's call the value of the velocity shock that corresponds 
to this situation v**. (This can also be seen as a state contingent condition) (see figure 
3.5).
In order to avoid the violation of the arbitrage condition, we need to impose the value 
matching condition between the exchange rate under a fully credible target zone and a 
target zone with an overdraft facility:
3.30) sk *i7.(V*) = SoFr/(v**)
Moreover, given that it is assumed that intervention takes place only at the boundary, 
it must also be true that:
3.31) s = sKTz(v**) -  sOFr7.(v **)
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Recall that under a FCTZ the equation ior the exchange rate, when v = v**, is:
3.32) sPCTz(v**) = ln
D
D*+G
+ v** + (a /2) svv
and that under a OFTZ the equation for the exchange rate is:
3.19') SoFr/.(v**)=( 1 +ap)-1 [ In p  Lo+ aPln^ ~ ^ ) - |-v**+
+ (1 +ap)-1 (o/2)o2Softz,vv
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D , D -L °  D
=  In—— — +(l+ap)', [ln—— — — — - In — — —  ]+ v **h D*+G v D*+G + L D+G
+(1 +ap)~ l (co'2)o2s01.-r/v
where L° indieates the initial size of the loan.
Note that, as the curve for the OITZ is steeper than the FCTZ,
PP’ < PP"
(see figure 3.5)
hut PP' = - (1+ap) SOFTZ.W ant  ^ I’l* = ■ sFCT7..vv 
hence:
3.33) - (1 +ap) sq|.t / vv < - Spcrz,w
It then follows that if equation 3.30) has to hold, it is necessary that
3.34) In
D -L °  
D*+G + L°
In
D
D+G
so that at the time of the switch between the FCTZ and the OFTZ there is a discrete 
negative jump in the money supply. Given that the model assumes that l) and I)* are 
constant, the money supply can decrease only if the loan starts being used and if the 
initial loan is of discrete size.
Intuitively, the fact that at the time of the switch the initial loan needs to take a 
positive, discrete value can be explained by observing that at the time of the switch, 
the expected change of the exchange rate, which is negative under a fully credible 
target zone, becomes positive due to the presence of expected devaluation if the loan is 
called back. L° must be large enough so to compensate for the expected devaluation. 
Note that the size of the initial loan depends on the size of the probability p that the
84
loan is called back: the higher p. the higher L° has to be in order for equation 3.30) to 
hold.
The distance vB - vA is proportional to the initial size of the loan, L°. giving that, 
similarly to equation 3.28)
3.28) vB - vA  = (1 + a p H  H " ^ - , n D ^ + i o l
so that as L° increases also vB - vA increases.
Note, however, that vB - vA represents both the decrease in the money supply due to 
the initial loan, L° and the effect of the change in curvature and the expected 
devaluation, in case the loan is called back.
3.4 Implications of the target zone model with an overdraft facility
A crucial aspect of this model is the specification of the expected change of the 
exchange rate:
3.35) I-:t (ds/d‘) = (l/2)cr2 svv + p (ln(l)/(D*+G) + v - s(v))
The first component, (l/2)o2 svv , reflects the expected movement of the exchange 
rate inside the band.
The second component is the expected devaluation, where the size is given by the 
difference between the freely floating exchange rate, which prevail if the loan is 
recalled, and the exchange rate inside the band, and the probability is given by the 
arrival rate of the Poisson process, p.
One assumption of the target zone model, which we need to recall here, is the one of 
validity of the Uncovered Interest Parity, Ht(ds/dt) = i - i*. where i (i*) is the 
instantaneous domestic (foreign) interest rate on fiurodeposits (i.e. offshore financial 
assets).
The former specification of the instantaneous expected change of the exchange rate 
implies the presence of a 'peso problem' in the interest rate differential and, via the
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Covered Interest Parity, on the forward premium in case the loan is not recalled, and 
so there is no switch between the target zone and the free float.
If the agents form expectations rationally, then the actual future value, say at time t+dt. 
of the exchange rate equals the expected value of the exchange rate formed at time t, 
given the information available at time t plus a white noise disturbance which 
represent the news occurring after the expectations have been formed:
3.36) St+dt = Et st+(jt + ut+cjt
If, however, there is some probability, even small, of an event which does not 
materialise in the time interval considered, then:
3.36') sl+(jt * Iitst+dt + ut+dt
The wedge between the LHS and the RHS of equation 3.34') is the measure of the 
'peso problem' (the first mention of the 'peso problem’ is contained in Krasker (1980); 
for a detailed explanation see Obstfeld (1987)).
In other words, even if the UIP holds, the realised change of the exchange rale will 
differ from the instantaneous interest rate differential plus a white noise disturbance. 
The presence of the 'peso problem' in the behaviour of the interest rate differentials 
compared to the actual change of the exchange rate for the period preceding the exit of 
the British Pound and the Italian Lira from the LRM, has been widely recognised by 
the literature: with the exception of Italy and Spain, which had sizeable positive 
interest rate differentials with Germany for quite a long time, the interest rate 
differentials with respect to Germany remained subdued until late in the Summer of 
1992, but at that time they increased very rapidly and reached very high levels (see 
Ldison and Kole (1994), Rose (1994), Rose and Svcnsson (1994)). Therefore, any 
model which aims at explaining the behaviour of exchange rates and interest rates
86
before the fall should generate this phenomenon: the model proposed in this chapter 
has this characteristic.
In addition to generating a 'peso problem' in the phases anticipating a switch between a 
target zone and a free float, the model outlined here has another implication for the 
interest rate differential, which can be tested empirically and. again, focuses on the 
peso problem' component of the interest rate differential:
3.37) p(s+ - s(v)) = p(ln(D/(D*+G)) + v - s(v))
By looking at figure 3.4. it is possible to observe that the jump in the exchange rate at 
the time of the switch is not bounded and increases as the loan used by the domestic 
central bank to defend the parity of its currency increases. The IT locus can be seen as 
the free float shadow' exchange rate, in a similar fashion as in Mood and Garber 
(1984), i.e. as the exchange rate which would dominate in absence of the authorities' 
intervention and the presence of the loan, intervention which allows the domestic 
country to live on borrowed time. At the time of the switch the exchange rate 'rewinds' 
the effect of the cumulated shocks and jumps onto the shadow exchange rate locus. 
For this reason, the 'peso problem' component in the interest rate differential will show 
nonstationarity and so the interest rale differential.
Note that this is a very particular case and is caused by the jump of the money supply 
at the time the switch between a target zone and the free float takes place.
We will test for this empirical implication of the model for interest rate differentials 
in chapter four.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter offers an explanation on one of the factors of the currency crisis which 
caused the exit of the British Pound and the Italian Lira from the FRM in September 
1992. It focuses on the willingness of the Bundesbank to support the existing parity, 
and so the existing fluctuations hand, for the above currencies, by granting
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respectively to the Bank of iingland and the Bank of Italy a loan which could become 
infinite in size. The willingness of the Bundesbank to do so. or the probability that it 
calls back the loan granted to the above central banks is a signal of the sustainability of 
the system: the model proposed in this chapter shows how this feeds in the 
expectations of the future exchange rate from the agents in the foreign exchange 
market. This particular aspect of the crisis has not been considered until now in the 
theoretical literature on the topic. Note, however, that our model does not cover other 
significant elements of the crisis, such as the pressure coming from the real exchange 
rate appreciation and the consequent loss of competitiveness, which hit most notably 
Italy, and the influence of the increasing unemployment level on the governments' 
actions. These limits derive from the theoretical framework of our model, given by the 
monetary model of exchange rate determination with fully flexible prices, where it is 
assumed that Purchasing Power Parity holds continuously and that output is fixed at 
the level corresponding to full employment.
A particularly desirable implication of the model is the presence of a peso problem' in 
the interest rate differentials before the switch from the target zone and the free float 
takes place. It is a very well established fact that in the months immediately preceding 
the switch, the domestic interest rates rose considerably compared to the ones 
prevailing in Germany.
The model proposed here can be extended in a number of ways. Two, however, seem 
to be the most important extensions, l irst, it is possible to consider in the model not 
only the possibility that the loan is recalled and, hence, the exchange rate is forced to 
float, but also the possibility that the exchange rate can be subject to a realignment, 
despite the loan being granted. Secondly, it could be possible to express the arrival rate 
of the Poisson process for the recall of the loan as an increasing function of the amount 
of loan being used. We also noticed how an empirical implication of the model is that 
the interest rate differential when there is an expectation that the loan is recalled, and 
the domestic country is forced to float its currency, has a nonstationary component in 
it. We will investigate the empirical implication of the model in the next chapter.
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Appendix to chapter 3
In this appendix we will prove that the S-shape curve lor a target zone with an 
overdraft facility (OITZ) is steeper than the one for a fully credible target zone 
(FCTZ).
Consider sl r r /  and SQj.-jy and shift them so that: 
a 3.1) SpcTz(O) = Sqftz (0) = 0
(i.e. they pass through the origin) (figure 3.6).
By making explicit the expressions for A'] and A'2 it is possible to write sK»jy(v) as:
a 3.2) sh t / v) -
e + e
and similarly:
a 3.3) sO I T Z ( v )
« 1 + *'1
’ r ' v  I
J
1
r \  v-v
L* " > ] !
where:
a 3.4) I r' I > I r I
the rcKit of the characteristic equation for the ()I'TZ is greater than the one for the 
FCTZ (see equation 3.22 in the main text)
and
a 3.5)
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v = - v ; v = v
(where v (y ) is the upper (lower) limit for the FCTZ and v ( y ) is the upper (lower)
limit for the OFTZ) given to the symmetry of the two families of curves.
In order to prove that S()FTZ is steeper than sK.r / , we need to prove that
a 3.6) v < v
We do this by exploiting the relationship:
a 3.7) Sofiv, ( v ) = sk t z  ( v ) = v
and so
where the second term of both I.HS and KHS is negative. 
Suppose, now, that
a 3.8) v < v
and such that:
a 3.9) rv = r'v
the equality a 3.7) thus becomes: 
a 3.7’) v -(B /r)= v - < B/r )
where: 
a 3.10) H = Bopi7 -B k -I7 > 0
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a 3.11) J F C T Z  -
_ /  2rv —2rv\
-2  + (e  +i? )
f 2rv -2rvl
\e ~ e  \
>o
and
„ (  2r ' v  - 2r \  \
- 2 + lt f  + e  I
a 3.11') BOFrz - ~T~~r
I 2 rV
given a 3.4) and a 3.10), it follows that: 
a 3.12) - (B/r') > -(B/r)
and the equality a 3.7') holds.
Suppose now, instead, that 
a 3.8') v > v
it then follows that:
a 3.13) r'v > rv
This implies:
a 3.14) - (B0 |.*|y/ r') > - (B^-py/ r)
hut this would violate condition a 3.7')!
Hence,
a 3 .15) v < v
and Sq|,'|-/ (v) is sleeper than sK-|y (v), as we intended to prove.
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Chapter 4:
Expected Regime Switches and the Behaviour of Spot and Forward Exchange
Rates
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4.1: Introduction
In the previous chapter we proposed a model of the HRM currency of 1992. which 
analysed the effect of the stance of the Bundesbank towards defending or not 
defending the currencies of the System under attack. In particular, we assumed that the 
countries whose currencies are weak live on 'borrowed time', by using a loan made by 
the Bundesbank which can be called back at any time, and investigated the effect of 
the probability that the loan is called back and the exchange rate forced to Boat on the 
expectations of future exchange rate and the interest rate differential.
This chapter focuses on the behaviour of spot and forward exchange rates and interest 
rate differentials, when the agents expect a switch between two different regimes.
The second section describes the model proposed by Evans and lewis (1993), which 
aims to explain the presence of a nonstationary component in the excess returns of the 
major exchange rates. It will be shown that in general this model does not seem to be 
satisfactory. The third section presents an alternative model, proposed by Engel and 
Hamilton (1990) which is a better framework for modelling regime switches. There is 
however a particular case in which the model by Evans and Ixiwis is still valid: this 
involves the switch between a target zone and a free Boat, under the circumstances 
shown in chapter three. Its analysis is the subject of the fourth section. Section five 
considers the empirical implication of this framework and an application to the case of 
the regime switch for the Italian I .ira and the British Pound in September 1992: the 
case of the French Franc will be considered as a control variable.
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4.2: The Evans and Lewis Model for Excess Returns in the Foreign Exchange 
Market
In their article published in the European Economic Review (June 1993), Evans and 
lewis find evidence that, for the exchange rates of the Deutsche Mark, the British 
Pound and the Yen during the period 1975-1989, excess returns in the foreign 
exchange market (i.e. the differences between spot rates at, say, time t+k and the 
forward rate set at time t for maturity t+1, sl+ j - ft | ) contain a permanent component, 
in other words follow a nonstationary process.
The explanation offered by the authors for this phenomenon is given by a so-called 
generalised peso problem'. This takes place when the agents expect a shift in the 
process of fundamentals determining the exchange rate, which then generates a shift in 
the process for the exchange rate, but this does not occur in sample.
The authors consider the possibility of switching between two alternative floats, 
having each a different mean and variance, f  ormally, for each regime j, with j = C 
(current) or A (alternative) the exchange rate may be written as the sum of a 
permanent and a transitory component:
4.1) st lj = utlj+ e tlj 
(this is equation 6 of their paper)
where:
4.2) Uj,t = ul. l l j + r ltlj
with T|j t -  i.i.d. (0, o J) 
and e jt  -1(0).
(iiven the specification for uj p it is also possible to express ut as the sum of the past 
shocks:
and so:
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4.2') ut|j = SU Hrl j
and
4.2") st,j = I ' , . ,  n tU + KO) terms
If the agents attach a positive probability, to the switch between the current (C) and 
the alternative (A) regime between time t and t+1, and the switch does not occur in
sample, so that the regime prevailing at time t+1 is still C, then:
4.3) st+) I C - Et (St+)) = st+1 I C + (1 - Xt) Et (St+1l C) + Xt Et ( W  A)
It is also assumed that excess returns can be decomposed in two components: the ex­
post forecast error, sl+j - Ktst+| , and the risk premium (in other words, the risk 
premium is not restricted to be equal to zero as in the case of the UIP), so that:
The authors also note that both on theoretical and empirical grounds the risk premium 
can he modelled as a 1(0) variable.
It then follows that the nonstationary component in the excess returns is given by the 
difference between the two random walks (the term in brackets) in equation 4.3).
In order to gel this result, however, it is crucial to assume that at the lime of the switch 
of regime the exchange rale is expected to he subject to a discrete jump from the level 
under the current regime. s(+| I C, to the one that would have prevailed if for the 
whole period from x = 1 to x = l + 1 the exchange rate would have followed regime A. 
st+ | I A (see note 9 in livans and Lewis paper).
= st+| IC - Kt (St+il C) + Xt ((St+1 IC) - (St+1 1 A))
= ?it ( X ' r . , ^ c  - XI», n tM) + | (0)
4.4) st+l • *1,1+1 -  st+l • 'Hst+I ■ T t
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The authors refer to the two alternative regimes as one of a depreciating dollar and one 
of an appreciating dollar. Then, the implications of the model outlined above are such 
that at the time the switch occurs, say from an appreciating to a depreciating phase, the 
exchange rate is expected to jump to the level that would have prevailed if for the 
whole period the exchange rate kept depreciating instead than appreciating.
When the possibility of a switch between two random walks with different drifts is 
considered, this setting is not either very satisfactory or very realistic. In particular, it 
does not seem very realistic that at the time of the switch of the exchange rate jumps 
from st+ 11C to st+ j I A.
4.3: A more satisfactory model: The Hamilton model
The model proposed by l.ngel and Hamilton (1990), an application of the Hamilton 
filter, discussed in chapter 1, and Kaminsky (1993), an extension of the same 
technique, appears, on the contrary, to offer a more satisfactory framework when a 
switch from a depreciating (appreciating) to an appreciating (depreciating) regime is 
considered.
In her model, Kaminsky assumes that the change in the exchange rate can follow 
either of two regimes, formally:
4.5) st+i - st = 8j
where i = 0, I 
and 8j -  N (pj, ctj2)
(compare with equation 4.2").
In the first part of her paper, Kaminsky assumes that the agents know the current state, 
but don't know the timing of the switch to the alternative regime.
The transition probabilities between the two states can be expressed as follows:
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P (rt+1 = I I rt = l ) = p 11
p (r t+) = 2 I rt = 1) = 1 - Pi i
4.6)
p (rt+] = I I rt = 2) = 1 - P22
p (r l+i = 2 l r t = 2) = p22
It follows that the expected change of the exchange rate (given that the agents know 
the current regime) may be expressed as:
4,7)
and
Ht st+i - st = p1 1  m +(1 - Pi l) M2 if = 1
T) Et st+i - st = (1 - P22) Ml + P22 M2 if rt = 2
As in the model by Kvans and Ixwis, also this setting considers a switch between two 
random walks, each having a different mean and variance, but the empirical 
implications of this model are substantially different compared to the ones of the 
former model.
As equation 4.7) and 4.7') show, the expected change in the exchange rate does not 
have any permanent component in it, it is simply a weighted average of the drift 
prevailing in the two regimes. It then follows that there is no reason why, even taking 
into account that the agents know that the process followed by the spot exchange rate 
can shift between two alternative regimes, the excess returns should follow a random 
walk.
4.4 A Particular Case where the Evans and Lewis model is valid
There is, however, a particular case where a modified version of the model proposed 
by Evans and I ew is can be applied satisfactorily.
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Instead than two random walks, let's assume that the two alternative regimes lor the 
spot exchange rate are given by:
- a free tloat
- a target zone, such that the exchange rate can fluctuate only inside a given hand
A theoretical model that considers this framework in a continuous-time environment 
has been proposed in chapter 3 of this thesis .
One of the assumptions of the model is that the velocity shock follows a Brownian 
motion without drift; a consequence of this assumption is that the exchange rate under 
a free float regime follows a Brownian motion too, i.e. by considering a discrete-time 
environment, a random walk Also, it is assumed that the domestic country, Britain or 
Italy, has run out of reserves and that the target zone is still sustainable for the 
presence of a loan from the Bundesbank to the national monetary authorities. At any 
time, however, the 'overdraft facility' can be called back and if this happens, the 
exchange rate will jump on the free float locus and the loan paid back. Call the 
probability of the loan being called back, and so the probability of the switch between 
the target zone and the free float The locus where the exchange rate jumps if the 
loan is called back is the one which would have prevailed if for the whole period, 
subsequent to the moment when the loan started being used, the exchange rate was 
floating (alternative regime) instead than being in a target zone (current regime); this 
situation would have occurred if no overdraft facility' was in place. In this setting, 
then, it is satisfied the condition, outlined in the previous section, which needs to hold 
for the livans and I ewis model to describe regime switches in a satisfactory way. 
Formally, it is possible to rewrite the equation for the exchange rate (in a target zone) 
as:
4.8) stiTZ = m - m* + oiXtlvt (st+ | I FF) + a( 1 - Xj) Ht (st+| ITZ) - a s (ITZ
= m - m* + aXt s^pp + a( 1 - X() Ht (St+ i I TZ) - otstITZ
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where st+1 IFF is the exchange rate which would prevail if for the whole period (since 
when the loan started being used) the regime was one of a free float.
Consider now the order of integration of the variables appearing in equation 4.8). As 
Ball and Roma (1992) observe, the presence of the fluctuation bands for the exchange 
rate induces a mean reverting behaviour for this variable, so that it is a 1(0) variable: 
the same can be said, for the same reason, for (Sf+jITZ). On the contrary, the 
exchange rate in the free float, the 'shadow' exchange rate, follows a 1( 1) process, and 
so its expected future value.
It follows that the order of integration for the spot exchange rate under the current 
regime, the target zone, and the one for the expected future exchange rate is different, 
the first being a stationary variable, while the second is a nonstationary one.
The difference of order of integration among variables can be exploited empirically, in 
order to detect any expectation of a switch between the target zone and the free float 
on the parts of the market, for example for the Italian Lira and the British Found 
during the currency crisis of September 1992.
By recalling equation 4.4), it is possible to express the forward rate as the sum of the 
expected future spot rate and a risk premium:
4.9) U.t+l = t^t ¡H+l + T i = ^t OH+ll**') + 0  * ^t) l-t (st+ll TZ) + 1(0)
= Kj(st+1 IFF) + 1(0)
It is then clear that the forward exchange rate and the exchange rate that is expected to 
prevail in case of the switch to the free lloat follows the same process. It then follows 
that given the assumptions above, the forward exchange rate follows a 1(1) process.
As was noted in the case of the switch between two different random walks, the type 
of process followed by the expected future exchange rate (and hence the forward rate) 
depends crucially on the definition of the exchange rate prevailing in case the switch 
occurs, that is the shadow exchange rate’.
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If at the time of the switch there is no step change in the fundamental determining the 
exchange rate or the step change is only due to the change in drift in the process 
followed by the fundamentals, then the forward exchange rate is still a stationary
process.
An example of this alternative scenario is given by the model of speculative attacks 
proposed by Obstfeld (1986), which considers the switch between a fixed exchange 
rate system and a free float and the speculative attacks issues linked to this.
His argument is that the attack of a fixed exchange rate system is self-fulfilling, so that 
it can occur even if the current stance of the monetary policy is consistent with 
maintaining fixed exchange rates, and so it can happen irrespective of the current 
values of economic fundamentals.
In his model, Obstfeld assumes that in case of a collapse of the system and a switch to 
the free float, the monetary policy changes from a restrictive one to an inflationary 
one.
formally, under a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic credit, Dt, evolves 
according to an autoregressive rule:
4.10) Dt = D + vt
where
4.11) V( = p v t. |  + e t
()<p< 1 and et is i.i.d. Ht(et+i) = 0
Subsequent to a collapse of the system, the rule followed by the domestic credit is: 
4.10') Dt = Dt_ j + nt
where Ht(pt+1) > 0
or, in terms of equation 11),
p = 1 and lit(et+]) > 0
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In other words, the adoption of an inflationary policy is contingent to the occurrence 
of the attack (and hence to the switch to the floating of the exchange rate). If the attack 
does not occur, then the monetary policy is not going to he subject to any change in 
stance. Given this assumption, Obstfeld proves that it is possible to get multiple 
equilibria, each corresponding to a different set of public beliefs about the probability 
of the run.
A crucial element in the analysis is the possibility of having two different states of the 
world:
a) under the first, which occurs with probability Jt, the agents believe that a run will 
occur if the shock to domestic credit will be higher than a given threshold;
b) under the second, which occurs with probability (1-Jt), no run will take place, 
irrespective of the value of the shock to domestic credit
Hence, the occurrence of the attack depends on two factors:
a) the probability that the state of the nature according to which a run can occur, 
indicated by Jt,
b) the probability that the shock to domestic credit is greater than a given 
threshold, q(u).
The outcome of either stale I or state 2 is determined by an exogenous lottery. The 
expected future exchange rale is then a weighted average of the fixed exchange rale 
(with probability (I - rcq(v)) and the rate expected to equilibrate asset markets in the 
event of an exchange rate collapse (with probability 7tq(u)) (see equation (12) in 
Obstfeld paper).
Because the change of the rule for domestic credit pertains only to the future, i.e. from 
the moment of the collapse onward, it then follows that the domestic credit (and the 
fundamental) up to the time of the collapse follows the 'stationary rule' given hy 
equation 4.10) and so the shadow exchange rate and the expected future exchange rate 
are stationary variables.
A similar conclusion (a stationary process for the expected future exchange rale, and 
hence for the forward rate) can be obtained also if another class of models of
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speculative attacks is considered: the one which attributes the collapse to a non­
contingent change in the rule for domestic credit. In this case, the fixed exchange rate 
regime collapses as soon as the agents realise that the monetary authorities will modify 
the domestic credit rule (see Hichengreen and Wyploz 1993). The difference between 
this type of models and the one proposed by Obstfeld is that in the first there is no 
expectation of a collapse until the change of the monetary policy is perceived as 
inevitable, while in Obstfeld's model it is perfectly possible that there is a positive 
expectation of a collapse, without this happening.
In the previous models the step change in the fundamental at the time of the switch is 
due to the change in drift in the rule for the domestic credit. In the model of an 
imperfectly credible target zone proposed by Krugman (1991a), in case of a switch to 
the free 11 oat, there is no change in the fundamental itself, given by the fact that in 
both regimes (the target zone and the free float) the fundamental has zero drift (or the 
same drift). In his framework, a switch to the free float is only possible when the 
exchange rate hits either of the two limits of the fluctuation band. When this happens, 
it is assumed that with probability <{> the band is defended and the exchange rate jumps 
to a perfectly credible target zone; with probability (1 - <p) the band is not defended 
and the exchange rate jumps to its free float value, given by the current level of the 
fundamentals.
Recently Ozkan and Sutherland (1994) have proposed a model that explains the 
currency crisis in terms of the behaviour of the German interest rates.
They assume that the German interest rate can me modelled as a driftless Brownian 
motion, so that:
4.12) i* = e
and
4.13) de = adz
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In their model, the switch from fixed exchange rates to a free float takes place at a 
threshold value for e. e = e , the and is the outcome of an optimising decision on the 
part of the government.
Also, under the free float the exchange rate is equal to et and at the (expected) time of 
the switch, i.e. when eT = e (T indicates the time of the switch), the exchange rate is 
equal to k e .
Now, as the switch is expected to take place the first time et hits e . it is also possible 
to write:
4.14) s-p = ke-p = ke
e j  is nothing else that the sum of all the past shocks, given that, for t < T, et < e .
Also, at the time of the switch there is a jump in the exchange rate from s=() (the level 
at which the exchange rate is fixed) to sT = ke > 0 .
In the model, the domestic and foreign interest rates are defined as composite rates, 
formed as weighted averages over all maturities: it is also assumed that U1F holds. The 
distribution for the maturities is given by a Gamma distribution of the form 
r2 (t  - 1) e‘r<x " *).
If UIP holds, then, the composite expected rale of change of the exchange rate. F, can 
be expressed as:
4.15) F = Et [s(x) - s(t)J r2 e’r(T - 1> dt
Given the assumptions relative to the shadow exchange rate, it then follows that the 
interest rate differential, F, has a random walk component.
4.5 Empirical Methodology, Description of the Data and Results
The implications of the modified Evans-Lewis model are empirically tested by using 
forward exchange rates and interest rate differentials.
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Both the forward rates and the interest rate differentials will follow a stationary 
process if there is no expectation of a switch or if the probability of a switch is very 
small; on the contrary they will follow an integrated process if there is a probability of 
a switch and this is large.
We use hurocurrencies with I and 3 months maturity and the forward exchange rate 
with similar maturities, for the Italian Lira, the British Pound and the french franc 
against the Deutsche Mark. The frequency of the data is daily.
The period considered goes from 5 October 1990 (when the British Pound joined the 
LRM) to the day preceding 'Black Wednesday' (15 September 1992) for the British 
pound, from 9/1/1990 to 15/9/1992 for the Italian lira and from 2/1/1990 to 15/9/1992 
for the f  rench franc, for a total of 719 observations (see figure I to 6). The data 
source is DATASTRLAM .
The technique used is given by the test for unit roots due to Phillips and Perron 
(1988), which, as we observed in chapter 2, is more appropriate than the ADf one in 
the presence of overlapping data, i.e. when the frequency by which the data are 
collected is shorter than the maturity of the contracts.
The results mainly support what expected by the model presented in chapter 3(see 
table 4.1). The analysis of the forward rate usually shows a higher percentage of 
rejection of the null hypothesis than the one of the interest rate differential at both 
maturities examined here, l or the french franc the overall result is that no shift has 
been expected, as the theoretical model we proposed would suggest, l or the Italian 
I ,ira, the hypothesis of the presence of a permanent component is not re jected in most 
cases, but the analysis of the forward rale with I month maturity shows that the 
permanent component has appeared only very late in the period. The results for the 
British pound show an overall impossibility to reject the null hypothesis, but the 
analysis of the graph of the series induces to consider the result with caution. We are 
aware that unit root tests are affected by low power, and so our results need overall to 
be taken with caution, however it is comforting that the hypothesis of the presence of a 
unit root for France is rejected, as we expected.
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The difference between the results shown above in this chapter and the ones contained 
in chapter 2 does not come to a surprise, in our opinion. As we reported in this 
chapter, as well as in chapter 3. and as it is possible to note by looking at the graphs 
(figures I to 6). interest rate differentials started increasing substantially only during 
the summer of 1992; the sample we used in chapter 2 is limited to March 1992, when 
there were still no signs of the crisis showing up in the pattern followed by interest 
rate differentials.
Finally, one issue that needs to be mentioned is the maturity of the forward rate and 
the interest rate differential which are used for the empirical estimation. Ideally, very 
short maturities should be considered, but for these maturities the interest rate have a 
very high component due to the interventions of the monetary authorities on the 
monetary market in order to guarantee its liquidity; this component might strongly bias 
the results. For this reason, longer maturities have been chosen.
4.6: Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the analysis of forward exchange rates, compared to spot 
exchange rates, once there is an expectation on the side of the agents of a switch of 
regime. It has been shown that the model recently proposed by Evans and I^wis 
(1993) is not satisfactory in general. More satisfactory, on the contrary, is the 
framework due to lingel and Hamilton (1990) and Kaminsky (1993). There is 
however, a particular case in which the Fvans and l^wis model might be applied; this 
concerns the switch between a target zone and a free float, under certain conditions. A 
theoretical model that develops this idea, focusing on the phases before the exit of the 
British pound and the Italian Lira from the HRM. is contained in chapter 3 of this 
thesis. Here we have shown that the empirical implications of the model for the 
behaviour of forward exchange rates and interest rate differentials seem consistent 
with the data. Given, however, the very low power which characterises unit root tests, 
it could be useful to extend the analysis to test for the presence of a break in the series 
as well as to test for stationarily of forward rates and forward premiums on a sample
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which excludes the period prior to the crisis. In the first case our model would be 
supported if a structural break was found; in the second case we would expect to find a 
stationary behaviour for the series under scrutiny in periods where no switch of the 
type described in chapter 3 is expected (see the analysis contained in chapter 2).
One extension that could be fruitful would imply the analysis of other financial 
instruments conveying information on the expectations of the agents, such as options 
on foreign exchange rates.
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Figure 4.1a: Interest rate differential France Gernany
F i g u r e  4 .  I h :  1 non th  fo rw ard  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  FF/Dfl 1 .1938 9 . 199Z
F i g u r e  4 . Z a :  I n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  I t a l y  Gernany
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Figure 4.3a: Interest rate differential UK Germany
F i g u r e  4 . 3 b :  1 month fo rw ard  exchange  r a t e  £/Df1 1 .1330 3 . 133Z
F i g u r e  4 . 4 a :  I n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  F ra n c e  Germany
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Figure 4.5a: Interest rate differential Italy Germany
F ig u re  4 . 5 b :  3 month fo rw a rd  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  Lit /Dfl  1. ISSO S . 1SS2
Table 4.1: Empirical Results from Phillips and Perron test 
for interest rate differentials and forward exchange rates 
1.1990-9.1992
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Zita) Z(<t>3) Z(d>2) Ho
FFDM 1 -4.67 10.98 7.34 R
FFDM3 -4.69 11.09 7.41 R
GBPDM 1 -2.46 4.35 2.96 NR
GBPDM3 -2.01 2.64 1.81 NR
LITDM 1 -1.59 2.82 2.30 NR
LITDM3 -3.78 7.57 5.09 R
FGINT1 -3.30 6.09 4.39 R
FGINT3 -2.29 3.78 3.02 NR
PGINT1 -1.10 2.05 2.77 NR
PGINT3 -0.61 1.80 3.43 NR
IGINT1 -2.99 5.10 3.43 NR
IGINT3 -0.85 2.39 1.70 NR
The estimated regression is:
Axt = (i + a xt. i + 3t + et
Z ^ )  is the (modified) t-test for the significance of a  
Z(<t>3) is the (modified) F-test for the hypothesis a  = p = 0 
Z(<J>2) >s the (modified) F-test for the hypothesis p = a  = 3 = 0 
4 lags included (similar results are obtained by including 10 lags)
Critical values for a 10% size of the test are: -3.13 for Z f^). 5.36 for Z(d>3) and 4.05 for 
Z(<D2).
'R' means that the null hypothesis is rejected 
'NR' means that the null hypothesis is not rejected
FFDM. GBPDM, LITDM are the forward exchange rates between the French Franc the 
British Pound and the Italian Lira against the Deutschmark: 1 and 3 refer to the maturity 
horizon.
FFDMINT. LITDMINT. GBPDMINT are the correspondent interest rate differentials: 
again, 1 and 3 refer to the maturity horizon.
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Chapter 5:
Employment, Unemployment and Participation Rates in Europe: 
EU versus EMU
5.1: Introduction
The ongoing discussion on the prospect of the implementation of the European Monetary 
Union and its viability has been widely reflected in the academic literature. One strand of 
the literature has resulted in a return of popularity for the theory of optimum currency 
areas, proposed by Mundell (1961). As Krugman (1992) points out: ' ....(the traditional 
optimum currency area approach) still captures the most fundamental considerations 
(relative to policy problems of a Monetary Union)...my guess is that when dust has 
settled, the old optimal currency area approach will still occupy centre stage..' (Krugman 
1992. page 194).
An 'optimal currency’ area is one where the loss of the instrument given by the possibility 
of modifying exchange rates as a response to shocks in the system, is not costly, l or this 
to be true, and so to have an 'optimal' currency area, two conditions need to hold: first, 
most of the shocks to the system have to be of a common and not idiosyncratic in nature; 
second, efficient adjustment methods must be in place, in other words the production 
factors must be highly mobile. Bayoumi and Eichegreen also note that another condition 
is that, in case of idiosyncratic shocks, these must be limited in size.
One of the focus in the recent literature has been the labour market in the light of the 
criteria just outlined: the research to date has considered, on one hand, the case of the US 
(Blanchard and Katz 1992), as the major example of a currency union, and, on the other 
hand, some of the European countries and their relationship with their regions 
(Eichengreen 1992b) and the liuropean regions as a whole (Decressin and Eatis 1995). No 
systematic study, however, is available to date for the European countries as a whole. The
aim of this chapter is to analyse the characteristics of the labour market in I Europe as well 
as in each member country in the light of the optimum currency area theory and to 
evaluate the feasibility of a European Monetary Union for the European countries.
The chapter has seven sections: in the second section we will survey the literature 
available to date and introduce the analysis contained in this chapter. In the first part of 
the third section, the choice of countries considered here and the time span will be 
detailed and motivated. We will then describe the time series behaviour of the variables 
analysed in the paper: employment growth, unemployment rates and participation rates, 
both for each individual country and in comparison with the corresponding series at EU 
level.
The fourth section will be devoted to the analysis of the nature of employment shocks 
(i.e. either common or idiosyncratic) hitting the European labour markets; section five 
will focus on unemployment rates and on the long run relationship between national 
unemployment rates and the EU one. Section six will contain the univariate analysis for 
the country-specific, or relative, variables, the size of shocks and the analysis of the 
impulse response function thus obtained; in this section we will take advantage of the 
cross-section dimension of the data, as well as the time series one, by estimating the 
univariate behaviour for relative variables by pooling all the countries together and 
adopting panel data analysis. The European case will then be compared with the US one. 
finally, conclusions on the feasibility of a currency union for the EU will be drawn in the 
seventh section.
5.2: A Review of the Literature
The analysts of currency unions encompasses a large number of issues, ranging from 
monetary policy, to fiscal policy, problems related to the transition period and the degree 
of optimality of a currency area (see De (irauwe 1994 and Masson and Taylor 1993 for
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very extensive surveys of the literature on all these issues). It is within the framework of 
the last issue that the analysis contained in this paper lies.
The seminal paper by Mundell (1961) stresses the importance of the nature of shocks, 
whether they are symmetrical or asymmetrical, in order to establish the degree of 
optimality of a currency union: while symmetric shocks can be easily absorbed within a 
currency union, asymmetric shocks might be difficult to cope with, once it has become 
impossible to change nominal exchange rates. That is to say, adjustments in exchange 
rates are not a useful instrument for symmetric shocks to be absorbed, while they are for 
asymmetric shocks. Another relevant aspect is the mobility of production factors: given 
that the higher their mobility, the easier is the adjustment process. Finally, also the size of 
asymmetric shocks is relevant, as a large one could demand the adoption of an 
independent national policy in order to be absorbed.
The recent empirical literature has tackled the issues just outlined by pursuing a 
comparative analysis of the US, which has been a successful currency union for over two 
hundred years, and the HU, as it was until 1993, i.e. before Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined. A strand of the literature has focused on the analysis of aggregate output and 
prices. Bayoumi and Hichengreen (1993) estimate a structural VAR, on the lines 
suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989), for 11 of the HU countries and the US states 
over the period 1960-1988, in order to identify the nature of demand and supply shocks 
and determine the response to these. Their results show that the correlation of both supply 
and demand shocks tends to be higher in the US states than in the HU countries and so in 
the HU shocks tend to be relatively more asymmetric. Moreover, as for the response to 
shocks, the US slates adjust more quickly than the liU countries, reflecting the higher 
factor mobility for the US states. Another important finding, relative specifically to the 
HU, is that supply shocks are larger in size and less correlated with the HU as a whole for 
the periphery' than for the 'core' countries.
114
A similar methodology, implying the estimation of a structural VAR, has been adopted by 
Bayoumi and Thomas (1995), who consider the relationship between fluctuations in 
relative prices and real relative output, again for the US and the EU and for the period 
1961-1989. Both output and prices have been measured here relative to the behaviour in 
the rest of either the US or the EU and so reflect intra-state or intra-country movements. 
The most important result of this analysis is the finding that the EU is characterised by a 
high relative price response to both demand and supply shocks, which is not matched by 
the US, where other adjustment mechanisms, in particular through more integrated goods 
and factors markets, are in action; according to the authors, this might imply a more 
difficult and costly adjustment process for the EU, once the single currency will be 
adopted. Also in this paper, as well as in the one reviewed above, there is a clear core­
periphery pattern emerging within the EU.
Another strand of the literature has focused on labour market adjustment to shocks. 
Eichengreen (1990) analyses the experience of the US compared to the EC9 (i.e. the 
members belonging to the EU before 1981) and observes that in Europe the dispersion of 
unemployment rates among the member countries is much higher than in the US. Because 
this dispersion might be due either to the high incidence of asymmetric shocks or to 
different responses to common shocks, the author analyses the long run relationship 
between unemployment rates at country (state) level and for the whole EU (US) and the 
speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium, by modelling the statistical relationship 
between unemployment at EU (US) and each country (state) as an 'error correction form' 
(ECM). The author observes that, both for the US and for the EU. it is necessary to 
include a time trend in the ECM in order to find a long run relationship between the 
variables. The result shows that the estimated speed of adjustment to equilibrium lor the 
US is much higher than for the EU; this implies that response of unemployment to shocks 
for the states of the US is much higher than lor the countries of the EU. The inclusion of a 
time trend in the long-run relationship does not seem very satisfactory and in the analysis
contained in this chapter we adopt different techniques in order to test for the long-run 
relationship between unemployment rates at country (state) and at Community (federal- 
US) level.
A much broader analysis of the US labour market and of its response to shocks is 
contained in the seminal paper by Blanchard and Katz (1992). The analysis focuses on the 
effects of a state-specific negative shock to employment and. in particular they examine 
how the state labour market adjusts, if wages decrease relative to the rest of the US or 
people migrate as response to the employment shock and if jobs are created once the 
effect of the shock has died out. The stylised fact shown by the authors for the US states is 
that while negative shocks have permanent effects on employment, thus implying that 
employment never recovers to the pre-shock level, the same shocks seem to have only 
transitory effects on unemployment. The explanation the authors suggest of this 
phenomenon is that, given the mobility of labour within the states of the US, the response 
to adverse regional shocks, in addition to an initial decrease in real wages, is the out­
migration of workers, not the creation of jobs.
The importance of inter-state migration as an important adjustment mechanism in the US 
labour market has been observed also by Bayoumi and I’rasad (1995). who also note that 
labour Hows across countries in Europe have a very little role to play. This is also true 
within some of the EU countries: as Eichengreen (1992b) shows, the inter-migration 
between regions in the UK and Italy is substantially lower than migration between US 
stales.
A similar type of analysis to the one by Blanchard and Katz is contained in the paper by 
Decressin and l itas (1995), who consider the behaviour of the labour markets and their 
response to shocks for the regions of the EU countries. Their results indicate that regional 
employment shocks tend to be more asymmetrically distributed in Europe than in the US, 
that the persistence of employment shocks is higher in the US than in Europe and finally 
that while in the US the major response to an employment shock is migration among
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different states, in Europe the burden is carried by changes in participation rates. Given 
that the analysis refers to the HU on a regional-basis, it is not possible in this framework 
either to compare the relative performance of each of the EU countries in absorbing 
employment shocks or to see if there is any clear pattern core-periphery as the one found 
in the dynamics of prices and output, reviewed at the beginning of this section. It is for 
this reason that the analysis of the EU countries and not regions has been preferred and 
pursued in this chapter.
5.3: The Data: choice and description
5.3.1 The choice of countries, time span and data set
The choice of countries, time span and data source is far from being a trivial matter, when 
the analysis involves an institutional grouping of countries, like the EU, which has 
increased the number of members over time and variables like the ones relative to the 
labour market, and specifically unemployment, where definitions adopted by national 
statistical offices may not be comparable across countries.
As for the choice of countries we faced three different alternatives: we could consider the 
small subsample given by the countries which joined the EU, then called Common 
Market, at its outset in 1957, or we could consider the 15 countries which belong to the 
EU now; we chose a middle ground and decided to run the analysis for the 12 countries, 
which were part of the EU until Austria and Sweden joined at the beginning of 1994. The 
reason for this choice is the aim to be consistent with the literature reviewed above, which 
usually focuses on the so-called EC 12. However, once the choice of countries was made, 
we had to drop the consideration of Portugal, because data are available only from 1974 
and the cost of dropping a country seemed smaller than reducing the sample size for the 
whole group.
As for the time span considered, the period considered ranges from 1971 to 1990 in the 
majority of cases. Ideally, a longer period, starting from the early '60s, would have been 
preferred, but data for the EU aggregate, as well as for several countries, are only 
available, on a consistent basis, since 1971.
It is understood that the limited sample size can be a cause of concern, and caution will 
be advocated in interpreting the results of the empirical analysis, however the importance 
of the issues analysed in this paper is such that work in the field is required, no matter the 
limitation of the data.
Finally, we had two choices in terms of data sources: OECD and EUROSTAT. OECD 
provides data on a quarterly basis, while EUROSTAT provides quarterly data for 
unemployment, but annual data for the other variables under scrutiny; hence our first 
choice was obviously OECD. However, once the data were collected and processed, the 
graphs representing the lime series evolution of the series showed that while for some 
countries the variables had been seasonally adjusted, others were showing clear seasonal 
patterns. Not knowing the type of seasonal adjustment, where we thought the variables 
had been filtered, we preferred to turn to the EUROSTAT dataset (we used the data 
recorded in the dataset Cronos/EUROSTAT, available on-line). Furthermore, according to 
the latest report 'Employment in Europe: 1994', by the European Commission, 'the
Community Eabour Force Survey, which is directed by Eurostat.... is the main source of
comparable unemployment figures for the Community as a whole' (p. 30).
5.3.2: A look at the data
Before outlining the methodology followed and the results obtained it is important to 
inspect graphically the time series behaviour of the variables under scrutiny, for each 
country and for the EU counterpart.
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Figure 5.1 reports the graphs for annual employment growth, defined as the first 
difference of the log of total employment, in each of the EU countries, compared to the 
average in the EU as a whole.
The F.uropean experience shows that employment growth was positive for the very 
beginning of the 70s, between the late 70s and the beginning of the 1980s and since 
1984, while it was negative in the mid 70s and in the first part of the 1980s. The most 
prominent aspects for the national counterparts are as follows: Germany experienced a 3% 
decrease in employment in 1975, much higher than the one for the HU as a whole. The 
pattern of employment growth for France and Italy is broadly in line with the EU average. 
The Netherlands had an unusual rate of growth in 1987, far above the one of any other EU 
country (1). The UK faced a negative growth of up to 4% at the beginning of the '80s. 
Ireland performed substantially better than the EU in the second part of the 70s, but much 
worse in the '80s. On the contrary, Spain under performed in the 70s, while it 
outperformed the EU in the '80s. The Danish experience is quite difficult to explain as the 
growth rate for employment does not seem to follow a clear pattern; finally, Greece seems 
to have outperformed the HU for most of the second part of the 70s and the first part of he 
'80s, while it under performed in the second part of the '80s.
The same message, but shown more clearly, can be drawn by examining the graphs of the 
relative employment growth rates (see figure 5.2), calculated as the difference between 
employment growth rates in each HU country and the HU average.
The analysis of the cumulated relative employment growth allows one to examine how 
each country performed over the long term compared to the rest of Hurope (see figure 
5.3).
Figure 5.3 shows, first, that for the majority of cases there was a substantial divergence 
between each country and the EU as an average. The most striking cases are for Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Greece. Germany experienced a highly negative 
relative employment growth in the mid 70s: employment growth in Germany stayed in
119
line with the one in Europe since then, thus the initial drop was never recovered. Belgium 
experienced an employment growth rate smaller than the EU average over the period and 
thus the cumulated pattern appears ever decreasing. The Netherlands and Greece seem to 
share an outlier in relative growth, which took place in 1987 for the Netherlands and in 
1981 for Greece (2). Spain had a consistently smaller growth than the EU until the mid 
1980s, but recovered, at least partially, since.
Figure 5.4 reports unemployment rates, calculated as the difference between the log of the 
labour force and the log of total employment.
It is very well known in the literature (see, among the most recent papers. Bean 1994a and 
1994b, Alogksoufis el al. 1995, Bertola and Iachino 1995) that all the European countries 
not only faced a sharp increase in unemployment in the 1970s, but the effect of the 
negative shocks that hit the Western economies in the 1970s was highly persistent: 
although unemployment decreased in the second half of the 1980s, it still remained on 
relatively high levels and it started increasing again since the beginning of the 1990s. 
This phenomenon has been widely analysed in the literature and many models have been 
proposed in order to explain it (see Bean 1994b for a very comprehensive survey). The 
unemployment pattern in Europe in the 1980s is strikingly different compared to the US 
case, where, after the increase in the 1970s, unemployment decreased sharply in the 
decade after. Given the common experience for the Western European countries, 
however, the literature has not paid much attention to the analysis of each EU country 
compared to the EU average, which will be developed later in the chapter.
As for participation rates, figure 5.5 shows that, contrary to what observed for relative 
employment growth, there is a clear difference between the 'core' countries (Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium) and the EU periphery (Greece, Spain and Ireland): the 
’core' countries tend to have higher participation rates than the EU average, the opposite 
being true for the periphery of the Community, as well as for Italy.
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In most cases the difference between participation rates at country level and at the EU one 
tend to be almost constant throughout the period; exceptions are f rante, where the 
difference vis-à-vis the EU average switched from positive to negative between 1986 and 
1987, the Netherlands, which experienced a positive step change in its participation rate in 
1987 and Greece, subject to a similar, albeit smaller in magnitude, phenomenon in the 
early 1980s (3).
5.4: Are employment shocks common or idiosyncratic in nature?
The first part of the analysis contained in the chapter focuses on the nature of employment 
shocks, asking if these are mostly common or country-specific. In order to do this, I 
follow the methodology proposed by Blanchard and Katz ( 1992) and regress employment 
for each EU country against the EU counterpart. However, before doing that, it is 
essential to examine its time series properties and order of integration, so that it is known 
if the variables need to enter the regression in levels or in first differences.
As shown in table 5.1. it is impossible to reject, according to the ADE test the hypothesis 
of a unit root for the level of employment (in logs), for all the European countries as well 
as the EU aggregate, although we allowed for the presence of a deterministic trend in the 
alternative hypothesis (4).
Given that all the series, with the only exception of the one for Denmark, appear to be 
integrated of order one, it is interesting to test if there is there is a long run relationship 
between total employment in each country and in the EU as a whole.
To test for cointegration with such a small sample (1971-1990) is not an easy task. As 
Banerjee, Dolado. Galbraith and Hendry (1993, chapter 7) stress, the two-step procedure 
suggested by Engle and Granger (1987), which provides super-consistent estimates of the 
cointegrating relationship, might need a large sample before the estimate biases are small; 
in these cases the authors suggest to run a dynamic regression of the type;
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growth is common (and so symmetric) and how much is country-specific (i.e. 
idiosyncratic): the values of /?2 range from 0.8 for Belgium to -0.004 for Denmark: the 
weighted average, where the weights are given by the country employment shares, is 
equal to 0.26. The analysis contained in Decressin and Katas (1995), on the lines of 
Blanchard and Katz (1992), shows that, once regression (5.3) is run for the states of the 
US on a similar time horizon to the one used in this paper, the average is 0.60, which 
clearly shows a much higher degree of integration of the US labour market compared to 
the Kuropean one. For the Kuropean regions, they obtain an average R~ equal to 0.20: this 
clearly reflect the smaller degree of integration of the Kuropean regions compared to the 
Kuropean countries. It is interesting, however, to note that the average /?2 at country level 
is not much higher that the one at regional level and both are far from the corresponding 
value for the US, indicating that, at Kuropean level, employment shocks tend to be 
idiosyncratic in nature.
In accordance with what we observed relative to the cumulated employment growth, there 
is no clear difference, in terms of R2, between the core and the periphery of the KU.
The second aim of this part of the analysis is the calculation of country-specific 
employment growth (relative employment growth), which will be the focus of a latter part 
of the analysis. In order to do this, we specify a dynamic regression for the employment 
growth in each KU country and the one in the KU :
2 2
(5.4) Aej j = kj + ¿ ¿ u  \ j  Ae; (./ + £ / $  \%m + ejtt
/=1 m=0
and calculate the long run parameter P*¡ = ¿  ß i,m ! O* ¿ I a  i,/ )»1=0 /=1
We then lest for the hypothesis
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(5.5) H0 : P*j = 1
A long run coefficient, P*. equal to one implies, in equilibrium, unit long run elasticity of 
employment growth in country i with respect to employment growth in the EU as a 
whole, as far as common shocks are concerned. If the null cannot be rejected, we can 
define the relative employment growth as the difference between the country and the EU 
value, i.e. as:
(5.6) Arej t = Ae,t - A eEUt
(where Arej stands for relative employment growth in country i) 
otherwise, it will be defined as 'P-difference', i.e.:
(5.6’) Arej-t = Aej<t - P*A eRu,t
The null can only be rejected for France, Greece and Italy (see table 5.4); we will then 
adopt in the analysis to follow simple differences (5).
5.5: Unemployment rates: long run relationships and definition of the relative 
counterpart
After having analysed the nature of employment shocks in the EU, the long run 
relationship between employment growth in each EU country and the EU as a whole and 
having defined the concept of relative employment, we now focus on the long run 
relationship between unemployment rates in the EU countries and the EU itself as a 
whole. This type of analysis allows one to examine if the variables at a national level tend 
to maintain a stable relationship with their European counterpart. Previous work for the 
US (Blanchard and Katz 1992) has run this type of analysis by applying unit root tests to 
the difference between state variables and the ones for the whole US; for the European
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regions, Decressin and Fatas (1995) estimated the long run relationship implicitly running 
the approach to cointegration suggested by Engle and Granger (1987). In particular, they 
first run the regression:
(5.7) ui,t = a i + 7i uEU.t + ei.t
where uj t is the unemployment rate for country i at time t; the unemployment rate has 
been calculated as the difference between (the log of) labour force and (the log of) total 
employment in country i.
The authors then test for the stationarity of the relative unemployment rate so obtained, 
given by uj t - y, uEU,t - which is equivalent to test for the stationarity of the residuals 
(which is the ordinary Engle and Granger procedure).
As it was observed in section 5.4, due to the small sample size, the estimates of the long 
run relationships are potentially biased and the test for cointegration, based on the 
residuals of equation 5.7 has low power. The results obtained by Decressin and Fatas do 
not allow, in the majority of cases, to reject the null of no cointegration between 
unemployment at country and EU level and they are forced to rely on their 'a priori' 
assumption that relative unemployment rates are stationary.
In this chapter, we propose to tackle the issue on long run relationship between national 
and EU unemployment rates in a different way. We first note that it is impossible to reject 
the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the series of unemployment rate for all 
the countries considered as well as for the EU as a whole (see table 5.5).
Clearly, the hypothesis that unemployment rates in Europe behave like a 1(1) process is 
not very appealing, but it is by now widely accepted that unemployment rate is a series 
showing a very high degree of persistence, as was reported in section 5.2, and great 
attention has been devoted in the literature to the issue of hysteresis in unemployment 
(see, among others, the seminal work by Blanchard and Summers 1987). It is very well
125
known that unit root tests have very low power, especially when the alternative hypothesis 
is a stationary series around a deterministic trend or a stationary series displaying a high 
degree of persistence. With respect to the latter, Campbell and Perron (1991) observe that 
it can be acceptable to model as 1( 1) processes stationary processes with very high 
persistence. For these reasons, recent empirical papers (e.g. Snower and Karanassou 1995) 
model the unemployment rate as a process behaving like a I( 1) and we follow the same 
route here.
In order to test for a long run relationship between unemployment rates in each of the EU 
countries and the EU aggregate, we follow the methodology outlined in section 5.3 and 
thus estimate the following dynamic regression:
In most cases p=q=2 is sufficient for all the diagnostic tests to be passed; only for Italy 
and Spain three lags are needed. Our prior is that there is a long run relationship between 
the country variables and the EU counterpart: the graphical analysis (see figure 5.4 and 
section 5.2) strongly supports this prior.
We test for the presence of a long run relationship for unemployment rates at country and 
EU level also by implementing the Johansen maximum-likelihood technique (see table
5.6). We specify the VAR by including two lags and allowing an unrestricted constant.
The results stemming from the estimation of the dynamic equation 5.7) are in line with 
the ones obtained by adopting the Johansen procedure: the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (and so of absence of a long run relationship between unemployment at 
country and at EU level), is rejected, or is accepted only marginally at the standard 
significance levels, in the majority of the cases: the only exceptions are Italy, Ireland and 
Greece (6)).
In the cases where the null of no cointegration could not he rejected, we run the same set 
of dynamic regressions, as well as the Johansen prticedure, for unemployment rates, as
5.8)
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recorded directly by EUROSTAT. In this case the null hypothesis is strongly rejected for 
Italy (see table 5.7), while it is still impossible to reject it for Greece, Ireland and 
Denmark.
Although the hypothesis that there is no long run relationship between the rate of 
unemployment in Denmark. Greece and Ireland does not seem very appealing, we adopt a 
cautious position here and consider in the analysis to follow both the whole set of EU 
countries and the subsample where Denmark. Greece and Ireland have been left out. The 
fact that the result is different, as Italy is concerned, according to the way unemployment 
is defined is an additional warning that the interpretation of the results must always 
proceed with caution.
After having tested for the presence of a long run relationship, we need to calculate, in the 
cases where a long run relationship has been found, the long run equilibrium. This is very 
important in our analysis, given that it enters the definition of the relative unemployment 
rate, which can be expressed as:
(where 7* is the long run parameter).
Another approach that can be adopted to obtain an efficient estimator of the long run 
parameter, and indeed of cointegrating vectors, has been recently suggested by Stock and 
Watson (1994): it implies, in our framework, a simple OLS regression between 
unemployment for each EU country on a constant, the average unemployment rate for the 
EU and leads and lags of its first difference:
5.9) rui.t = “i.t - 7*uEU,t
5.10)
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(we chose p=l).
We report the results in table 5.8: the estimates obtained by solving for the long run 
equilibrium in the dynamic regression are in line with the ones obtained adopting the 
procedure suggested by Stock and Watson. The only exception to this is Italy.
Finally, we investigate the speed of adjustment with which national labour markets 
respond to divergence's between national and KU-wide unemployment rates.
The dynamic equation 5.8) can be seen as a reparametrization of the Error Correction 
model, which (in case p=q=2) can be written as:
5.8’) Auj t = kj + PjAupc t - (1- a n  - a ,2) (U| t_j - (Pi+P2+P3)Al-ai-a 2)UEU,t-l) + 
+ a 2Auj<t_i - P.i Aukc.m  +£ j,t
Flence. the speed of adjustment can be measured as:
5.11) - ( l - a n - a j 2 )
or, in general terms.
Clearly, if there is no long-run relationship between unemployment at the national and EU 
level unemployment rate, the speed of adjustment is zero, which is exactly the test (of no 
cointegration) we have adopted before.
In the cases where we decided to reject the null of no long-run relationship, we examined 
the size of the speed of adjustment.
In the majority of the cases (see table 5.5) the speed of adjustment is quite high, ranging 
from - 0.742 for the Netherlands to -0.51417 for the UK; only for Italy its value is quite 
low, being equal to - 0.39589.
5. IT)
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We finally consider relative participation rates. If the problem of a small sample size is 
severe for employment growth and unemployment rates, it is even more so for 
participation rates: comparable data are available only between 1975 and 1989; as a 
consequence even more caution has to be used in interpreting the results.
Our prior hypothesis, supported by the graphical analysis contained in section 5.3, is that 
participation rates are stationary. Due to the limited sample size it becomes virtually 
useless to try and test for this hypothesis. Also the estimation of the long run parameter 
between country participation rates and the EU one becomes unfeasible and we prefer to 
calculate the relative log of participation rates as a simple difference between the country 
and the EU-wide ones.
5.6: The analysis of relative variables and their impulse response functions
The focus of this section is the analysis of relative variables, which were defined in the 
previous sections, in particular, we will examine how labour markets in the EU respond to 
idiosyncratic shocks and measure the size of these shocks. As mentioned in the 
introduction of the paper, in order for a currency union to be optimal idiosyncratic shocks 
should be small in size.
In particular we first estimate the univariate process for each of the country-specific 
variables above as an autoregressive process, by allowing two lags:
5.12a) Arejt = kl¡ + Arc¡ , _ j  + X¡2 Are¡ , _ 2  + e,
5 .12b) rujt = k2j+ <p,, r u ¡ + <pi2 ruu .2 + e,
5.12c) rlpri( = k3¡ + 1| it rlprl t_, + n ,2 rlpriit.2 + et
where Arc¡ represents relative employment growth for country i, ru¡ is the relative 
unemployment rate and rpr is the relative participation rate; k l, k2 and k3 are the 
constant terms in each equation and X. <t> and r) are the autoregressive parameters.
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We also run the same type of analysis for the HU as a whole: we do this by pooling 
together the relative variables for each country, allowing for country-specific effects. This 
type of analysis allows one to examine how the Huropean labour market as a whole 
responds to idiosyncratic shocks and to compare the Huropean experience with the US 
one.
By using the estimates of equations 5 .12a-5.12c, we can measure the size of the shocks as 
the standard error of the regression. We then build the corresponding impulse response 
functions (figures 6 to 8) which trace the effect over time of a one-standard innovation in 
relative employment growth, unemployment rate and participation rates (7). The results 
are contained in tables 9 to 11.
Regarding relative employment growth, the size of the initial shock for the HU as a whole 
is not too dissimilar to the one calculated by Decressin and Fatas for the US on a very 
similar time horizon; however, the cumulative impulse response function, which measures 
the degree of persistence of (relative) employment to employment shocks, is substantially 
smaller for the HU as a whole than for the US. As for the experience of individual 
countries, the size of the shocks tends to be larger than for the HU average for the 
countries at the periphery of the HU, in particular for Spain and Greece, but also for the 
Netherlands and Denmark. In the case of the Netherlands this could be due to the outlier 
in employment growth in 1987. For Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK the 
initial shock tends to be smaller that the HU counterpart; the degree of persistence tends 
to be higher than the one for the HU as a whole, for Italy, Ireland. Spain, while it tends to 
be smaller for France, Belgium, Denmark and the UK and is very similar for Germany 
and the Netherlands. With respect to the size and persistence of employment shocks, 
then, it is possible to trace a different pattern for the periphery of the HU relative to the 
rest of the member countries. This seems in line with the results obtained by Bayoumi and 
liichengreen (1993) and Bayoumi and Thomas (1995), reviewed in the second section of 
the chapter.
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In the case of relative unemployment shocks (8), their size seems to be smaller for the HU 
than for the USfsimilarly to the results obtained hy Decressin and Fatas 1995): moreover 
the shape of the impulse response functions shows that the effect of the initial shock tend 
to die out slightly more quickly in Europe. This corresponds to the high speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium in the long run relationship between national unemployment 
rates and unemployment in the whole Eli that was analysed earlier in the paper.
The size of unemployment shocks once again tends to be smaller for the countries at the 
core of the EU. in particular for France and Germany; on the contrary their size is 
substantially higher than lor the EU as a whole for Spain and the UK. The shape of the 
impulse response function for the effect of unemployment shocks indicates that it tends to 
die out more quickly (than for the EU) for France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, 
while it tends to he slower for Italy, Belgium and the UK.
The analysis of relative participation rates must proceed with extreme caution, given the 
very limited sample size available. In particular, the estimate of the autoregressive process 
for the Netherlands is not acceptable, given that it would imply an explosive process; this 
is most likely caused by the step change in the evolution of participation rate for this 
country in 1987. We then leave this case outside the analysis as well as the EU panel. The 
shocks to participation rates lend to be small, compared to the EU as a whole, for France, 
Germany, Italy as well as for Spain.
The impulse response analysis for participation rates shows that there is very little 
persistence for Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and most of all for the UK. The EU as a 
whole seems to show a substantially higher degree of persistence, however this result 
might be due to the strong persistence found for France and Belgium. Even if the results 
obtained by using a longer sample size might show a lower degree of persistence for the 
EU as a whole, it is unlikely that it would he lower than the one observed for the US. The 
explanation of this result might lie in a different adjustment mechanism under way in 
Europe compared to the US: while in the US employment shocks are absorbed through
migration among states, in Europe the (low in and out the labour force might cover an 
important role in the adjustment process, in addition to the role covered hy the movement 
in relative prices (as found in Bayoumi and Thomas 1994 and Krugman 1991).
Ideally, the estimation of a VAR between relative employment growth, relative 
unemployment rates and relative participation rates for all the HU countries could provide 
information on the adjustment mechanisms to employment shocks; however the limitation 
of the sample makes this task impossible.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the analysis of employment growth, unemployment rates and 
participation rates of the KU countries vis-a-vis the EU as a whole and on the study of the 
dynamics of their relative, i.e. country-specific, counterparts. This fills in a gap in the 
literature, where a systematic study of this type is unavailable to date.
Considerable attention has been devoted to the long run relationship between 
unemployment rates for the single countries and for the whole European Union; it has 
emerged that, while high persistence in unemployment is a common factor, in most of the 
cases the deviations from the EU average are absorbed quite quickly.
From the analysis of the relative (or country-specific) employment growth rates it is 
possible to conclude that, when the EU experience is compared with the US one, 
idiosyncratic employment shocks are more widespread in Europe than in the US, but they 
tend to have a more persistent effect in the US than in the EU. The results have to be 
evaluated with caution, as the total employment series for the Netherlands is affected by a 
structural break due to a change of its definition, which has not been corrected; although 
the break carries over the corresponding HU employment series, the distortion is limited 
by the fact that this variable is defined as a weighted average and the weight 
corresponding to the Netherlands is small.
The results obtained for the analysis of relative empoyment growth might be due to two 
different and, possibly concomitant, reasons: first the greater role played in Europe by 
relative prices in the adjustment process, as shown in Bayoumi and Thomas (1995); 
second, as Krugman (1991c. 1995) poinLs out. US states tend to he much more specialised 
than the HU countries, thus implying that idiosyncratic shocks have more persistent 
effects on the state economies. In principle, higher specialisation might also lead to a 
higher percentage of shocks being idiosyncratic: the fact that we find a lower percentage 
of idiosyncratic shocks in the US might be attributed to the presence of federal fiscal 
stabilisers in the US, which, most likely, will not he available, at least in the same degree, 
in the HU.
The consideration of relative unemployment rates has led us to conclude that there seems 
to he a slightly quicker response to shocks in Europe compared to the US, mostly due to 
the performance of countries like France and (iermany. if we exclude from the analysis 
countries like Denmark, Greece and Ireland, for which a stable long run relationship 
between their unemployment rates and the HU average has not been found. If the analysis 
is pursued by considering all the HU countries, however, than the response to shocks is of 
a similar type in the HU and the US.
Given the quick adjustment of relative unemployment rates, once a subsample of EU 
countries is considered, there has to be another adjustment mechanism in place in order to 
balance the persistence in relative employment. In the case of the US this role is played by 
migration inter-state, as shown in Blanchard and Katz and Krugman (1995); in Europe, 
however, migration is low: this is true not only among countries, but also within countries 
(Eichcngrccn 1992b). The fact that the response of relative participation rates is more 
persistent in Europe than in the US might he the adjustment mechanism in action in 
Europe alternative to migration; in particular, it is possible that most of the adjustment 
lakes place through the movement in and out the labour force of women, who arc more 
likely than men to move out the labour force in case they cannot find a job. Another
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a sp e c t o f  the c o u ld  he the d e c is io n  to  sp en d  m ore tim e in e d u c a t io n , and s o  o u t o f  the 
labour fo rce , b y  y o u n g  p eo p le  w h en  they  ca n n o t f in d  a job.
T h e  in te rp reta tio n  o f  the resu lts  o b ta in ed  fo r  re la tiv e  p artic ip a tion  rates, h o w e v e r , h as to  
he c a u tio u s , g iv e n  the  sm all sa m p le  s iz e  a v a ila b le  for  the e m p ir ic a l a n a ly sis .
T h e  f in d in g s  c o n ta in e d  in  th is  ch ap ter  regard in g  the r esp o n se  to  sh o c k s  o f  re la tiv e  
e m p lo y m e n t g r o w th  rates, u n e m p lo y m e n t rates and  p artic ip a tion  ra tes for the HU a s  a 
w h o le  su p p ort th e  o n e s , o b ta in ed  for  the E u rop ean  r e g io n s  in stea d  than  co u n tr ie s , 
co n ta in e d  in  the p a p e r  by D e c r e ss in  and lattLs.
O ur a n a ly s is , h o w e v e r ,  a l lo w s  u s  to  draw  a lso  so m e  c o n c lu s io n s  o n  the p erfo rm a n c e  o f  
ea ch  co u n tr y  c o m p a r e d  to  the o n e  o f  the H U as a w h o le , a s  far a s  re la tiv e  v a r ia b les  are 
co n cern ed . A n  in te restin g  p icture e m e r g e s  here: there i s  a co re -p e r ip h e r y  pattern  
em e r g in g . U s u a l ly  the s iz e  o f  the a sy m m e tr ic  sh o c k s  h ittin g  p e r ip h ery -co u n tr ie s , n a m e ly  
G r e e c e . Ireland  a n d  S p a in , i s  larger  than fo r  so m e  o f  the c o r e  c o u n tr ie s , su c h  a s  F ran ce. 
G erm a n y , B e lg iu m  (but n o t for the  N eth er la n d s) and  th ey  ten d  to  h a v e  a s lo w e r  resp o n se  
to  them : it m ig h t  b e  p o ss ib le , th en , that th e y  fin d  th e m s e lv e s  in  a  d isa d v a n ta g e d  p o sit io n  
w ith in  a  c u r r e n c y  u n ion . T h e  situ a tio n  m ig h t w o rsen  o n c e  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  in teg ra tio n  w ill  
h av e  had its  fu l l  e f fe c t  o n  d ie  l iU  e c o n o m y . K rugm an (1 9 9 1 c ,  1 9 9 3 )  n o t ic e s  that the 
p ro cess  o f  in te g r a tio n  and the e lim in a tio n  o f  the rem a in in g  b arriers in  the F U  w il l ,  m o st  
l ik e ly , g en era te  a g g lo m e r a tio n  e c o n o m ie s  ( s e e  the m o d e l b y  K ru gm an  an d  V e n a b le s  
1 9 9 0 ) and in c r e a s e  the in c id e n c e  o f  a sy m m e tr ic  sh o c k s , th u s  m a k in g  the  ad ju stm en t  
p r o c e ss  m o re  d if f ic u lt .
In the lig h t o f  th e  op tim u m  cu rren cy  area th e o ry , then , it ca n  be sa id  that w h ile  the co r e -  
c o u n tr ie s  m ig h t  b e  e f fe c t iv e ly  b e c o m e  part o f  a  cu rren cy  u n io n , the sa m e  fo r  the 
p e r ip h e r y -c o u n tr ie s  is  m u ch  m ore an  o p en  q u e st io n .
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Notes
(1) We checked the data for any input mistake: in particular we checked another definition 
of employment, civilian employment instead than total employment, as well as the data 
published on the quarterly Eurostat bulletin and found exactly the same pattern as the one 
reported in the chapter. We understand that there was a change in the definition of labour 
force and total employment, which makes the series relative to the Netherlands pre and 
post-1987 not comparable. We should have corrected for the change in definition, 
possibly by constructing comparable series using pre-1987 data on levels and growth 
rates, as the results of the analysis will be affected by the break caused by it. The results 
for the Netherlands are, obviously, the most affected and need to be interpreted with extra 
caution. As the EU average for total employment is concerned, however, the distortion is 
limited by the fact that this variable is defined as a weighted average and the weight 
corresponding to the Netherlands is fairly small (around 4%).
Note that the change in definition of the labour force and total employment lor the 
Netherlands should not affect substantially the analysis of unemployment rates as this is 
defined as the log difference of the two variables above mentioned.
(2) For Greece we made the same checks as the ones outlined for the Netherlands and we 
got the same results.
3) The step change in participation rates for the Netherlands and Greece can be 
reconducted to the step change in the labour force; see footnotes ( 1) and (2).
(4) The trend was included in the ADF regression due to the trending pattern of 
employment in all the countries considered.
(5) Decressin and Fatits (1995) define relative employment growth as the residuals from 
equation (5.3). Given that, however, they then estimate an autoregressive process for the 
relative employment growth, the approach does not seem satisfactory because it implies 
that the residuals are autocorrelated, thus generating estimates of P which are biased and
inconsistent.
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(6) Note that by running the Iingle and Granger procedure, the null of no cointegration 
cannot be rejected for any of the countries considered
(7) Consider a stationary AR(2) process Xt:
<fl> 0(1.) Xt = et
where 0 (1,) = 1 - <t>i L - <)>2[.2 
and e is a white noise process.
The AR(2) can be inverted and written in the MA form:
<f2> Xt = 0(L )_1et = A(L) et = (A jL+A2L2 +....+AkI.k+...) et 
where A(L) is an infinite polynomial in the lag operator.
The impact of a shock at time t on Xt+k is given by Ak.
The graphs of the impulse response function are represented by the sequence of the Ak for 
k=0.1,2......
Consider now an 1(1) process Yt which can be written as:
<f3> 0(1.) AYt = et
where 0(1.) has been specified above.
As noted before, the process can be written as:
<f4> AYt = 0(L)_1et = A(L) et = (1+A i I.+A2I.2 +....+AkI >+...) et
The impact of a unit shock on AYt+k is Ak while the impact on Yl+k is given by:
ck= l+Ai+A2+...+Ak
The entire sequence of cumulative responses C=(c*i,c2.....ck.....Coc) allows one to measure
persistence, i.e. the effect of a unit innovation in AY on the entire future levels of Y (see 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989)).
The cumulative impulse response function represents the plot of the sequence of the ck for 
k= l,2......
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Note that in order to generate impulse response functions from the estimation of an AR(2) 
process, two initial conditions are required; we follow the following steps:
a) sample 1 1
x = 0
b) sample 2 2
x = 1
c) sample 3 n
sim x = a]* x(-l) + a2*x(-2)
In order to derive a cumulative impulse response function we follow:
a) sample 1 1
y = x
b) sample 2 2
y = x + y(-l)
c) sample 3 n
y = x +  y(-l)
(8) For the Italian case we performed the analysis also by considering the relative 
unemployment rate as obtained by using the long run parameter from the Stock and 
Watson procedure; the results, however, are very similar and we do not report them here.
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F i g u r e  5 . 1 :  E n p lo y n e n t  grow th  r a t e s  1972 1990
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F i g u r e  5 .Z :  R e l a t i u e  employment g row th  r a t e s  1972 1990
b) Denmark
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F i g u r e  5 . 2  C c o n t) :  R e l a t i u e  e n p lo y n e n t  g ro w th  r a t e s  1372 1330 
e ) 6 r e e c e
f )  I r e l a n d
h )  N e t h e r l a n d s
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F i g u r e  5 . 3  ( c o n t i :  c u m u l a t i l i  r e l a t i u e  employment g row th  r a t e s  1972 1930 
e 1 G reece
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Figure 5.4 (cont): Unemployment rates 1371 1330
j )  EU ( ___ ) UK ( ----- )
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Figure 5.5: Participation rates 1975 1989
b) EU (__ ) Denmark (-- )
d) EU (__) Germany (-- )
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F i g u r e  5 . 5  ( c o n t i :  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  1975 1989
f )  EU ( ___ ) I r e l a n d  ( ----- )

Figure 5.6a: Response of relatiue employment, USA and EU
F ig u re  5 .6 b :  Response o f  r e l a t i v e  employment,  Belgium, Denmark and EU
Belg ium Denmark EU
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Figure 5.6c: Response for relatiue employment, France, Germany and EU
F ig u re  5 .6 d :  Response o f  r e l a t i v e  employment, G reece ,  I r e l a n d  and EU
Greece I re la n d EU
154
Figure 5.6e: Response of relatiue employment, Italy, Netherlands, EU
F ig u re  5 . 6 f :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  employment, S pa in ,  UK and EU
1
S p a i n UK EU
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Figure 5.7a: Response of relatiue unemployment rates. USA and EU
F ig u re  5 .7 b :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  unemployment r a t e s .  EU ( t o t a l )  and 
EU
EU ( t o t a l ) EU
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F i g u r e  5 .7 c :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  unemployment r a t e s ,  Belg ium, France 
and EU
F i g u r e  5 .7 d :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  unemployment r a t e s ,  Germany, I t a l y  
and EU
Germany Italy EU
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Figure 5.7e: Response of relatiue unemployment rates, Netherlands,
Spain  and EU
F i g u r e  5 . 7 f :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  unemployment r a t e s .  UK and EU
UK EU
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USA EU
F i g u r e  5 .8 b :  Response o f  r e l a t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s .  EU ( t o t a l )  and 
EU
EU(total) --------  EU
Figure 5.8c: Response of relatiue participation rates, Belgium.
F ig u re  5 .8 d :  Response o f  r e l a t i u e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s ,  F rance .  Germanu 
and EU ^
France Germany EU
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Figure 5.8e: Response or relatiue participation rates, Greece, Ireland
and Ell
F ig u re  5 . 8 f :  Response o f  r e l a t i o e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s ,  I t a l y .  Spain  
and EU
I t a l y Spa in EU
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T a b le  5 .1 : A D F  te s t  fo r  th e  lo g  o f  e m p lo y m e n t
t-value
EU - 1.2362
Belgium - 0.87409
Denmark - 4.3903 *
France - 1.3565
Germany - 1.4782
Greece - 1.9032
Ireland - 1.3624
Italy - 2.0951
Netherlands - 1.0051
Spain - 0.49455
United Kingdom - 0.96241
critical value (constant and trend included) at 5%: -3.712
Table 5.2: Test for the hypothesis ¡/ =1 in equation 1
tel
t-value
Belgium - 1.3037
Denmark 0.2284
France - 4.0381 (*)
Germany - 2.2192
Greece - 1.4897
Ireland - 2.248
Italy - 2.3862
Netherlands - 0.53759
Spain - 1.7368
u k - 2.2723
(*): significant at 5%
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T a b le  5 .3 : R2 in  th e  e q u a tio n  A e;^  =  kj + Pj A e p ^ t  + Ej;t
«2
Belgium 0.8
Denmark -0.004
France 0.384
Germany 0.178
Greece 0.0015
Ireland 0.1826
Italy 0.1832
Spain 0.3958
UK 0.3484
Table 5.4: Test for the hypothesis p*=l in equation 4
P* s.e. t-value
Belgium 0.9183 0.1302 - 0.6275
Denmark -0.9939 1.057 - 1.8863
France 0.5392 0.1415 - 3.2565 (*)
Germany 0.5001 0.5519 - 0.9057
Greece -0.1723 0.2576 - 4.3594 (*)
Ireland 1.206 1.251 0.1646
Italy 0.1766 0.1512 - 5.4457 (*)
Netherlands 1.096 1.129 0.0085
Spain 0.6806 2.2226 - 0.1437
UK 0.9108 0.6122 -0.1457
* : significant at 59c level
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T a b le  5 .5: A D F (2 )  test fo r  u n e m p lo y m e n t ra tes
t-value (constant, no trend) t-value (constant and trend)
EU -2.153 -0.90562
Belgium -2.0245 -0.44975
Denmark -2.4809 -2.2818
France -2.0496 -0.51138
Germany -1.9374 -1.6658
Greece -1.076 -2.0717
Ireland -2.0217 -2.1507
Italy -0.059045 -2.4149
Nehterlands -1.9606 -0.65904
Spain -2.0245 -2.7246
UK -1.9003 -0.65753
- Critical values (Constant, no trend): at 5%: -3.052:
- Critical values (Constant and trend): at 5%: - 3.712;
Table 5.6: long run relationship for unemployment rates
t-value for the hypothesis 
Xa; = 1
in equation (5.8)
Johansen's I.R test based 
on maximum eigenvalue
Belgium -2.8312 13.7477
Denmark - 1.4421 4.4039
France - 3.1638 13.1379
Germany - 3.7679 (*) 16.6265
Greece - 1.9464 9.6085
Ireland 0.57667 13.7089
Italy -1.7415 9.4089
Netherlands - 5.4506 (*) 22.9497
Spain - 3.8279 (*) 16.8991
UK - 2.8296 10.5196
- (*): significant at 5% level
- critical values for Johansen's LR test based on maximum eigenvalue: 14.9 at 5%, 
12.912 at 10% significance level
Table 5.7: long run relationship for unemployment rates 
(as reported directly in Eruostat sources)
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t-value tor the hypothesis 
lot; = 1 
in equation 8
Johansen’s LR test based 
on maximum eigenvalue
Denmark - 1.5013 7.0429
Ireland 0.32496 5.9482
Italy -5.3757 (*) 13.2742
(*): significant at 59c
Table 5.8: estimation of the long run parameter 
for unemployment rates
Dynamic regression 2.8 Stock and Watson 
procedure
7* s.e. 7* speed of 
adjustment
0 s.e. 0
Belgium 1.107 0.1132 - 0.38787 1.1566 0.056867
Denmark 0.6121 0.1964 -0.59 0.72748 0.10042
France 0.9168 0.03762 -0.64774 0.92129 0.032324
Germany 0.7372 0.04832 -0.6722 0.67318 0.056867
Greece 0.7372 0.1731 -0.299 0.81265 0.088724
Ireland 0.6627 1.084 0.1967 1.3222 0.081027
Italy 0.9166 0.2121 -0.3959 0.64645 0.046845
Netherlands 0.9223 0.04685 -0.742 0.88724 0.066916
Spain 2.394 0.08835 -0.6428 2.5707 0.088724
UK 1.05 0.08303 -0.5141 1.0911 0.062698
Table 5.9: estimation of AR(2) process for 
relative employment growth rates
166
k2 a
EU 0.22524
(0.07955)
-0.29574
(0.08267)
0.016102
Belgium -0.00022
(0.23749)
-0.46604
(0.23855)
0.00493596
Denmark 0.1357
(0.26692)
-0.16499
(0.30468)
0.0239657
France 0.26233
(0.24515)
-0.38947
(0.23615)
0.0085531
Germany 0.47551
(0.26204)
-0.29702
(0.25897)
0.00130871
Greece 0.1439
(0.26577)
-0.073817
(0.27261)
0.0199551
Ireland 0.33853
(0.29743)
0.19463
(0.30492)
0.01475
Italy 0.24322
(0.26683)
0.27395
(0.28116)
0.00970514
Netherlands 0.13429
(0.26111)
0.0085316
(0.25993)
0.0260798
Spain 0.42487
(0.2625)
0.074542
(0.2815)
0.0179302
UK 0.042626
(0.26397)
-0.11871
(0.27141)
0.0154979
- standard errors in brackets
- <5 is the standard error o f the regression
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Table 10: AR(2) for relative unemployment rates
91 92 a
EU 1.1814
(0.06928)
-0.43405
(0.07085)
0.00714
EU (partial) 1.2315
(0.074115)
-0.66212
(0.07787)
0.0054614
Belgium 1.4554
(0.19638)
-0.65732
(0.19946)
0.0042832
Denmark 0.57175
(0.24105)
-0.21481
(0.23498)
0.0111
France 0.95536
(0.24467)
-0.35329
(0.26792)
0.0039
Germany 0.99178
(0.1791)
-0.65563
(0.17335)
0.00362
Greece 1.2059
(0.21451)
-0.4229
(0.19456)
0.00511
Ireland 1.5037
(0.23737)
-0.63216
(0.23737)
0.00987
Italy 1.4583
(0.17746)
-0.7041
(0.18472)
0.00475
Netherlands 1.0565
(0.20122)
-0.60879
(0.28806)
0.005464
Spain 1.0114 
(0.19114)
-0.68737
(0.18936)
0.00747
UK 1.376
(0.21724)
-0.7356
(0.29415)
0.0069
- standard errors in brackets
- a  is the standard error of the regression
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Table 11: AR(2) for log of participation rates
m 02 a
EU 0.8996
(0.09095)
-0.07005
(0.09424)
0.013273
EU
(Neth. excluded)
0.94241
(0.09582)
-0.15361
(0.08795)
0.01
Belgium 1.22
(0.28147)
-0.47303
(0.32645)
0.075715
Denmark 0.53679
(0.32063)
0.21146
(0.27537)
0.011
France 1.6571
(0.27206)
-0.76576
(0.3545)
0.0043
Germany 0.56014
(0.31142)
-0.01212
(0.31055)
0.00362
Greece 0.99795
(0.30953)
-0.22185
(0.30007)
0.019195
Ireland 1.6012
(0.25886)
-0.75319
(0.32163)
0.0782
Italy 0.46171
(0.37833)
0.07127
(0.27458)
0.00643
Netherlands 0.81547
(0.3097)
0.13796
(0.36998)
0.30667
Spain 0.76879
(0.31734)
-0.12149
(0.19172)
0.008
UK 0.41431
(0.31971)
-0.11828 
(0.31227)
0.01334
- standard errors in brackets
- a  is the standard error of the regression
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CONCLUSIONS
As pointed out in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the debate 
over the ERM and the creation of a European Monetary Union, both by throwing new 
light on issues where no agreement has been reached in the literature and by 
investigating important areas so far overlooked.
In the first chapter we considered the process of disinflation which Europe and the 
USA experienced in the 1980s and the hypothesis that the ERM membership helped 
traditionally inflation-prone countries to bring inflation down. We noticed that all the 
empirical work available tests for the hypothesis of an 'ERM effect' by comparing the 
period preceding and the one following the creation of the ERM or the period pre and 
post-1983 with respect to the behaviour of inflation rate or the relationship between 
inflation and other macroeconomic variables, such as wage inflation and output 
growth, or the specification of wage equations over the two subperiods. Any parameter 
non-constancy is attributed to the 'ERM effect', in the light of the Lucas critique, 
according to which shifts in economic policy (such as the participation in the ERM or 
the policy turnaround in 1983) should alter those statistical relationships.
The results obtained following the above methodology clearly depend on the choice of 
a date break, which is chosen ex ante and exogenously by the researcher. But the 
methodology adopted in the first chapter, proposed by Hamilton, allows us to detect 
any structural break in an endogenous manner. In research reported in chapter one, we 
applied the Hamilton filter to the series given by the inflation differentials between 
each of the initial ERM against Germany for the period 1979-1990; we also considered 
the differential between the UK and Germany as a control variable, due to the fact that 
the UK experienced a reduction in inflation as the ERM countries, but outside the 
System itself. The results show a clear switch in regime from a 'high inflation' to a 
'low inflation' stale for France and Italy around the mid 1980s; but no clear switch has 
been detected for the small countries of the ERM, such as Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. This does not come at a surprise, given that the latter countries were part
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of the 'Snake' and the ERM was seen by them as a natural development of the previous 
exchange rate arrangement. It is very interesting to note that no regime switch has 
been detected in the case of the UK either; though this country experienced a 
reduction of its inflation level, it is not possible to find any structural break in its 
differential with Germany not to identify one state characterised by high inflation and 
another characterised by low inflation. This result, together with those obtained for 
France and Italy, is supportive of the view that the ERM membership helped inflation- 
prone countries to reduce inflation.
Given the particular interest of the results, we decided to push further this line of 
research, by analysing more closely the cases of France and Italy. When the sample 
was extended back to 1975, we still found a switch in regime around 1984, not at the 
beginning of the ERM in 1979, for both the countries mentioned above. This seems 
consistent with the theory that the ERM worked as a disciplinary device, but only 
when the commitment to stable exchange rates became credible.
We subsequently applied the extension to the Hamilton filter suggested by Garcia and 
Perron (1990): once two highly persistent states are found, this allows one to test for 
the existence of a third regime. The motivation for this type of analysis was to test for 
a further break around 1987, when the Basle-Nyborg agreement was signed, and a 
commitment to stable exchange rates was strengthened further. The results show that 
neither in the case of France, nor in the case of Italy does a third regime in the time 
series behaviour of inflation differentials with Germany seem present. This is not, 
perhaps, surprising for France, since that the mean differential already obtained by 
1984 was around 1%, leaving little scope for further convergence. But Italian inflation 
did not fully converge, with an average differential with Germany of 4% in the period 
after 1984. While the ERM membership generally helped the inflation-prone countries 
in the convergence process towards Germany when they first showed their 
commitment to stable exchange rate (around 1984), we have demonstrated that, at 
least for countries like Italy, where a substantial positive inflation differential still 
persisted, (for possibly good economic reasons), no further convergence was achieved
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when Banca d'ltalia reinforced its commitment to stable exchange rates with the other 
ERM currencies. It may well be that national differences in fiscal policies holds the 
key, although this is something we have not specifically investigated.
The presence of a persistent positive inflation differential, coupled with the absence of 
realignments (with the exception of the Italian lira in 1990) leads to the issue of the 
credibility of the commitment not to realign the central parities and, in case of 
imperfect credibility, to the analysis of the realignment expectations. The recent 
literature has focused on the behaviour of exchange rates under imperfect credibility 
and the theoretical specification and measurement of expected realignments (I.indberg 
and Soderlind 1992, Bertola and Caballero 1992, Bertola and Svensson 1994, Tristani 
1994). The most successful model is undoubtedly the one suggested by Bertola and 
Svensson, who model expected devaluations as following a Brownian motion process, 
or, in discrete time, a random walk. Given that the appeal of their model is the fact that 
it seems to fits the data, we decided to test directly for the hypothesis of the time series 
behaviour of expected realignment.
In our analysis we do not need to assume the validity of the Uncovered Interest Parity, 
but simply that the wedge between expected future exchange rate and interest rate 
differentials is a stationary process, which is obviously a less stringent assumption; it 
then follows that the assumption of a 1( 1) process for expected realignments implies 
the same order of process for the interest rate differentials.
We analyse weekly interest rate differentials on Eurocurrencies for the currencies of 
the initial ERM members against the German Mark for the period 1987-1991 and find 
that, once the presence of a negative trend is taken into account, the hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root is rejected, with the exception of the Danish krona. We get the 
same result when we consider the Swedish krona against the currency basket to which 
it was pegged until 1991. In our empirical analysis we apply unit root tests, as well the 
multivariate technique for testing for cointegration proposed by Johansen. The well 
known low power of unit root tests (i.e. the low probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root when this is false), in particular when the
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alternative hypothesis is either a stationary process with high persistence or a 
stationary process around a deterministic trend, does not constitute a problem in our 
analysis as we are able to reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in all 
cases but one.
Of course it is always possible to model the expected realignment so that it fits the 
data; one simply defines as expected realignment all that cannot be explained in terms 
of fundamentals. A better approach implies the formulation of an economic theory 
which clarifies the economic factors which influence expected realignments. We 
develop this line of thought in the theoretical analysis of the currency crisis of 1992, 
which led to the exit of the Italian lira and the British Pound from the I'.RM. Instead of 
considering the probability of realignment, we propose a model where there is a 
certain probability of leaving the System altogether. In the model it is assumed that 
there are two countries, one of which, say Italy, has exhausted its (available) reserves 
in defending the parity and is living on ’borrowed time’. It is assumed, in particular, 
that Italy has access to a loan of potentially unlimited amount granted by Germany, 
but Germany reserves the right to call the loan back at any time; once the loan is called 
back the target zone becomes unsustainable and a free float will characterise the 
exchange rate thereafter. In this setting, the expected future exchange rate has two 
components: the first is due to the expected change of the exchange rate inside the 
band, the second is due to the probability that the loan is called back times the 
expected jump in the exchange rate at the time of leaving the System. This model 
allows us to focus on the role of the stance of the Bundesbank towards the defence of 
the weak currencies of the System in the dynamics of the crisis and to show how the 
perceived position of the Bundesbank feeds back into the market expectations.
Note, however, that our model does not cover other significant elements of the crisis, 
such as the pressure coming from the real exchange rate appreciation and the 
consequent loss of competitiveness, which hit most notably Italy, and the influence of 
the increasing unemployment level on the governments’ actions. These limits derive 
from the theoretical framework of our model, given by the monetary model of exchange
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rate determination with fully flexible prices, where it is assumed that Purchasing Power 
Parity holds continuously and that output is fixed at the level corresponding to full 
employment.
We believe that the merit of the model proposed in chapter three of this thesis lies in 
the consideration of an important aspect of the 1992 currency crisis unjustifiably 
overlooked by the theoretical literature on the crisis.
We also provide some empirical support for our model. Contrary to what happens as 
far as expected realignments are concerned, this model of expected regime switches 
implies the presence of an 1(1) component in the expected future exchange rate and, 
hence, in the forward exchange rate and the interest rate differential between Italy 
(UK) and Germany. We test for this hypothesis for forward exchange rates and interest 
rate differentials at various maturities over the period January 1990-September 1992 
for Italy and the UK against the German Mark, with the French Franc also considered 
as a control variable. The results seem to support the hypothesis that there was an 1(1) 
component for the variables relative to Italy and the UK. We noted above that unit 
roots tests have low power and so the results are not very strong and need to be taken 
with caution; in order to get more robust results it could be useful to test for the 
presence of a break in the series as well as to test for stationarity of forward rates and 
forward premiums on a sample which excludes the period prior to the crisis. In the 
first case our model would be supported if a structural break was found; in the second 
case, we would expect to find a stationary behaviour for the series under scrutiny in 
the period where no switch of the type described in chapter was expected, such as the 
one before the summer 1992.
it is reassuring, however, that, despite the low power of the lest, our results show that 
the hypothesis of unit root is rejected for the French Franc, which in the crisis of 1992 
received full support by the Bundesbank.
The currency crises of both 1992 and 1993 had several facets and we refer to the 
literature (Eiichengreen and Wyploz 1994, Masson 1994, Ozkan and Sutherland 1994) 
for the analysis of the other aspects of it.
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Given that, despite the foreign exchange turmoil, the prospect of creating EMU by the 
end of the century is still at the top of the European political agenda, it seems 
important to investigate whether the EU as a whole has the characteristics necessary 
for successful currency union. The recent literature has revived the theory of optimum 
currency areas (OCA), originally proposed by Mundell (1961). According to this 
theory, the cost of giving up monetary autonomy and the possibility to adjust 
exchange rates will be negligible if the disturbances affecting the economies of the 
member countries are symmetric or if there is high factor mobility among the 
countries. A very detailed study of the post-war experience of the states of the USA 
(Blanchard and Katz 1992) shows that, given the impossibility to respond by changing 
exchange rates, adjustments to adverse shocks to state economies come mainly from 
migration of the labour force, and to a lesser extent through wage flexibility. The 
current situation in Europe is substantially different: as Eichengreen (1993, 1992 b) 
points out, not only is migration low among the EU countries, but also within these 
countries; it is quite unlikely that the situation will change radically in the near future, 
although some factors, such as the possibility to transfer pension schemes across 
countries, will ease labour mobility. Given this situation it is important to examine 
how employment shocks spread in Europe and how individual countries respond to 
them. This is the goal of the analysis contained in the final chapter of the thesis.
The results show that employment shocks in Europe tend to be idiosyncratic in nature, 
far more so than in the US. This type of shock tends to have persistent effects both in 
the EU and in the US, even if less in Europe than in the US; the lower degree of 
persistence of idiosyncratic employment shocks experienced in Europe is probably due 
to the role played in the adjustment process by changes in relative prices (Bayoumi 
and Prasad 1995) or by devaluation. With the loss of the exchange rate instrument and 
in presence of wage stickiness, however, it will be difficult to rely on such changes in 
relative prices, so it can realistically be expected that persistence of employment 
shocks will increase. This, and the result that in Europe the percentage of idiosyncratic 
shocks is far higher than in the US, points to clear difficulties in the adjustment
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process, once EMU starts. The results have to be evaluated with caution, as the total 
employment series for the Netherlands is affected by a structural break due to a change 
of its definition, which has not been accounted for; although the break carries over the 
corresponding EU employment series, the distortion is limited by the fact that this 
variable is defined as a weighted average and the weight corresponding to the 
Netherlands is relatively small. We therefore believe that for all the EU countries but 
Netherlands the results would be qualitatively similar if we used a modified series for 
employment growth which took into account the change in definition above 
mentioned.
As for unemployment rates, it is well known that they are more persistent in the EU 
than in the US. What we show, however, is that the deviations of national 
unemployment rates from the EU average die out more quickly than the analogous 
variable for the US states; it might be that exchange rates changes plunged a role in 
dumping the effects of idiosyncratic shocks. Moreover, our results show that 
movements in participation rates play quite an important role, in the EU, in the 
adjustment process, although the limited size of our sample induces us to interpret the 
result with caution.
One strong message coming from this type of the analysis and it refers to a pattern of 
core-periphery emerging in Europe; Greece, Ireland and Spain seem to have usually 
larger idiosyncratic shocks and the response to their effect seems slower; it could be 
possible, therefore that these countries might be in a disadvantageous position if the 
project of the Monetary Union will go ahead. The situation might worsen once we 
bear in mind that, as pointed out by Krugman (1993), that the most likely effect of the 
creation of a fully integrated European market will be an increase in specialisation, 
which can lead to increasing incidence of asymmetric shocks.
We are not in a position to forecast if the project of EMU will finally go ahead and, in 
this case, which countries will join. It seemed important however to try and deepen our 
knowledge on some of the issues which look critical in evaluating the EMU project.
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